added jellyfin

updated scripts
Initial commit
2026-08-18 15:14:23 +02:00 · 2025-07-08 10:14:41 +02:00 · 2025-07-08 09:14:59 +02:00
58 changed files with 118 additions and 3778 deletions
@@ -7,19 +7,9 @@
 # ─── …except the files that define a stack ──────────────────────────
 !*/compose.yaml
 !*/docker-compose.yaml
 # A service's alternative compose file, published as documentation. Narrow on
 # purpose: `!*/compose.*.yaml` would also un-ignore compose.override.yaml,
 # which is exactly where people keep local secrets.
 !*/compose.personal.yaml
 !*/.env.example
 !*/README.md
 # Support files a stack needs at runtime: init scripts, config fragments.
 # Keep them in a per-service `init/` directory so they are never mistaken for
 # application state.
 !*/init/
 !*/init/**
 # Docs are not service data.
 !docs/**
@@ -29,11 +19,3 @@
 *.pem
 *.crt
 secrets/
 TODO
 # VPN configs carry private keys. Named explicitly because the `!*/init/**`
 # rule above would otherwise happily commit one dropped in a service's
 # init/ directory -- which is exactly where this repo's own conventions
 # tell you to put runtime config fragments.
 wg*.conf
 *.ovpn
@@ -36,22 +36,10 @@ handled separately — see [Exposing services](#exposing-services).
 | Service | Port | Notes |
 |---------|------|-------|
 | [audiobookshelf](audiobookshelf/) | 13378 | Audiobooks and podcasts, with per-user progress sync |
 | [cloudflare-tunnel](cloudflare-tunnel/) | — | Outbound connector. Exposes other services without opening a port |
 | [codeserver](codeserver/) | 8443 | VS Code in a browser. Effectively a remote shell — read its README before exposing |
 | [copyparty](copyparty/) | 3923 | File server built for big/resumable transfers, WebDAV, media index |
 | [filebrowser](filebrowser/) | 3672 | Web file manager for one directory tree (FileBrowser Quantum fork) |
 | [firefly](firefly/) | 8564 | Personal finance / double-entry ledger. Also 8566 for the data importer |
 | [gitea](gitea/) | 3000 | Self-hosted Git with issues and PRs. Also 222 for SSH clone |
 | [gluetun](gluetun/) | 9880 | VPN kill switch with qBittorrent + pyload-ng inside it, plus HTTP/SOCKS proxies |
 | [heimdall](heimdall/) | 4080 | Dashboard / start page for the other services |
 | [httpserver](httpserver/) | 8083 | Bare nginx file share. Plain HTTP on purpose — works with very old clients |
 | [immich](immich/) | 2283 | Photo and video library with local ML search. Four containers, Postgres + VectorChord |
 | [librespeed](librespeed/) | 3011 | Self-hosted speed test. Measures the path to your box, not your ISP |
 | [jellyfin](jellyfin/) | 8096 | Media streaming. Also 7359/udp for auto-discovery |
-| [myspeed](myspeed/) | 5216 | Scheduled speed tests with history graphs. Records what librespeed measures on demand |
+| [openwebui](openwebui/) | 3033 | LLM chat UI, talks to an external model backend |
-| [openwebui](openwebui/) | 3033 | LLM chat UI. One `OWUI_TAG` switches between CPU, CUDA and bundled-Ollama |
+| [owui-ollama](owui-ollama/) | 3034 | Open WebUI bundled with Ollama |
-| [overleaf](overleaf/) | 8020 | LaTeX editor. Four containers: app, Mongo (replica set), Redis, init |
+| [overleaf](overleaf/) | 8020 | LaTeX editor. Needs Mongo + Redis |
 <!-- One row per service. Add as you go — the table is the index people scan. -->
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # ─── Identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Defaulted to 1000/1000 in compose.yaml. Unlike the LinuxServer images in
 # this repo, these are NOT passed to the container as PUID/PGID -- that image
 # ignores them. They feed Docker's `user:` directive, which actually changes
 # the uid the process runs as. Must own CONFIG_PATH, METADATA_PATH and be able
 # to read the media.
 #PUID=1000
 #PGID=1000
 #TZ=Europe/Paris
 # ─── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Audiobookshelf's database and settings. Small; defaults to ./config.
 #CONFIG_PATH=./config
 # Cover art, cached metadata, downloads. Grows with your library.
 #METADATA_PATH=./metadata
 # REQUIRED. The parent folder holding Audiobooks/ and Podcasts/.
 # compose.yaml mounts ${MEDIA_PATH}/Audiobooks and ${MEDIA_PATH}/Podcasts.
 MEDIA_PATH=/srv/media
 # ─── Ports ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Host port only. Do NOT add PORT to the container's environment -- the image
 # reads PORT to decide what it listens on internally, which would break the
 # 13378:80 mapping.
 #PORT=13378
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
 # Audiobookshelf
 Audiobook and podcast server. Tracks progress per user across devices, which is
 the thing a plain file share can't do — pick up on your phone where the car
 left off.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env            # MEDIA_PATH is required
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:13378` and create the admin account. Point the Audiobooks
 library at `/audiobooks` and Podcasts at `/podcasts` — those are the paths
 *inside* the container.
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 13378 | http | Web UI and API (container listens on 80) |
 ## Why it looks like this
 **The official image, not LinuxServer.** Audiobookshelf ships its own and it's
 the one upstream actually tests. That's a different call from jellyfin, where I
 stay on LinuxServer out of long habit — here there's no reason to add a layer.
 **`user:` instead of `PUID`/`PGID`.** This is the part worth knowing, because
 copying the pattern from the other services in this repo produces something
 that *looks* right and silently isn't. The image's config:
 ```
 User      : ''            <- empty, so root
 Entrypoint: ['tini', '--']
 Cmd       : ['node', 'index.js']
 ```
 There's no s6 layer and no init script — `tini` execs straight into Node. A
 `PUID` environment variable is accepted and then read by nobody. Everything
 gets written as root, and you find out when you try to move your library from
 the host and can't.
 Docker's own `user:` directive is the mechanism that actually works here, so
 `PUID`/`PGID` in `.env` feed that instead. Same names as the rest of the repo,
 different plumbing underneath.
 **`/config` and `/metadata` are separate mounts** because they grow very
 differently. `/config` is the SQLite database and settings — small, and the
 thing to back up. `/metadata` is cover art, cached data and downloads, and
 tracks the size of your library. Splitting them means a backup job can take the
 first and skip the second.
 **Two media mounts, not one.** Audiobookshelf wants each library rooted
 separately, so `${MEDIA_PATH}` points at the parent and the compose file mounts
 `Audiobooks/` and `Podcasts/` beneath it. Only `MEDIA_PATH` goes in `.env`.
 ## Gotchas
 - **`PORT` is a container variable here.** The image reads `PORT` to decide
  what it listens on internally. It's used in `compose.yaml` for the *host*
  side of `13378:80` only — if you ever add it to the `environment:` block,
  the container moves off port 80 and the mapping breaks with nothing in the
  logs to explain it.
 - **Switching to `user:` on an existing install needs a chown.** If you ran
  this as root first, the files it created are root-owned and the container
  now can't write them. `sudo chown -R 1000:1000 config metadata` once.
 - **Back up `/config`.** It holds the database — accounts, libraries, and
  everyone's listening progress. `/metadata` regenerates; `/config` doesn't.
 - **Media can be mounted `:ro`** unless you turn on storing metadata alongside
  the media files, which is off by default. Worth doing if you want the library
  protected from the server.
 ## Exposing it
 Publishes a plain HTTP port; nothing here is proxy-aware.
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md)
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — audio is far lighter than video,
  but it's still media served through the proxy; read
  [the limits](../docs/cloudflare-tunnel.md) before pointing a tunnel at it.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — Audiobookshelf
  speaks OIDC natively, so use that rather than forward auth: the mobile apps
  can't render a forward-auth login page. See the section below.
 ## Single sign-on with Authentik
 Worth doing here, because Audiobookshelf is one of the apps that speaks OIDC
 itself — real accounts, real logout, and the mobile apps keep working. Forward
 auth would break them.
 **It needs a reverse proxy first.** The whole flow is built from absolute HTTPS
 URLs, so there has to be a real hostname in front:
 ```caddy
 audiobookshelf.example.com {
    reverse_proxy <ip>:13378
 }
 ```
 Then follow
 [Authentik's Audiobookshelf guide](https://integrations.goauthentik.io/media/audiobookshelf/):
 create an OAuth2/OpenID Connect provider, note the application **slug**, and
 put the issuer URL, client ID and client secret into
 **Settings → Authentication** on the Audiobookshelf side. **Auto-populate**
 fills in the OIDC endpoints for you.
 ### The redirect URIs are where this goes wrong
 [Step 2 of the guide](https://integrations.goauthentik.io/media/audiobookshelf/#create-an-application-and-provider)
 gives these three:
 ```
 Strict  Authorization  https://audiobookshelf.company/auth/openid/callback
 Strict  Authorization  https://audiobookshelf.company/auth/openid/mobile-redirect
 Strict  Post Logout    https://audiobookshelf.company/login
 ```
 Those did not work for me. Mine needed an extra `/audiobookshelf` path segment:
 ```
 https://audiobookshelf.company.com/audiobookshelf/auth/openid/callback
 https://audiobookshelf.company.com/audiobookshelf/auth/openid/mobile-redirect
 ```
 **Don't guess at this — Audiobookshelf tells you the answer.** Its
 **Settings → Authentication** page has a subfolder section that prints the exact
 URIs to authorize:
 > Authorize these URLs in your OAuth provider to allow redirection back to the
 > web app after login:
 >
 > `https://<your.server.com>/audiobookshelf/auth/openid/callback`
 > `https://<your.server.com>/audiobookshelf/auth/openid/mobile-redirect`
 Copy those into Authentik verbatim. A mismatch surfaces as a generic error that
 doesn't name the URI, which is why this is worth ten seconds of checking rather
 than an evening of guessing.
 ### Mobile apps need their own redirect URIs
 The phone clients don't come back over HTTPS — they hand off to a custom URL
 scheme. These go in **Allowed Mobile Redirect URIs**:
 ```
 audiobookshelf://oauth
 https://authentik.company.com/auth/openid/mobile-redirect
 plappa://oauth        # Plappa, iOS
 prologue://oauth      # Prologue, iOS
 ```
 One per app: a client you haven't listed fails at the last step of a login that
 otherwise looked fine. Add the scheme for each third-party app you actually use.
 ## Links
 - Upstream docs: <https://www.audiobookshelf.org/docs>
 - Image: <https://github.com/advplyr/audiobookshelf/pkgs/container/audiobookshelf>
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
 services:
  audiobookshelf:
    image: ghcr.io/advplyr/audiobookshelf:latest
    container_name: audiobookshelf
    restart: unless-stopped
    # NOT a LinuxServer image: no s6, no init script -- tini execs straight
    # into node, as root. PUID/PGID would be silently ignored, so ownership is
    # set with Docker's own `user:` instead. See the README.
    user: "${PUID:-1000}:${PGID:-1000}"
    environment:
      - TZ=${TZ:-Etc/UTC}
    volumes:
      - ${CONFIG_PATH:-./config}:/config
      - ${METADATA_PATH:-./metadata}:/metadata
      - "${MEDIA_PATH:?set MEDIA_PATH in .env to the parent of your Audiobooks/Podcasts folders}/Audiobooks:/audiobooks"
      - ${MEDIA_PATH}/Podcasts:/podcasts
    ports:
      # 13378 is the conventional host port; the container always listens on 80.
      - "${PORT:-13378}:80"
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # NEVER put the real token in this file.
 # ─── Required ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Cloudflare Zero Trust tunnel token.
 #
 #   Dashboard -> Zero Trust -> Networks -> Tunnels -> (your tunnel) -> Configure
 #   https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/networks/connectors/cloudflare-tunnel/
 #
 # The dashboard shows a pre-filled `docker run ... --token <TOKEN>` command.
 # Copy only the token itself, not the whole command.
 #
 # Treat it like a password: anyone holding it can route traffic into your
 # network. If it leaks, delete the tunnel in the dashboard and make a new one
 # — the token cannot be rotated on its own.
 TUNNEL_TOKEN=
 # ─── Shared ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Defaulted to Etc/UTC in compose.yaml. Only affects log timestamps here.
 #TZ=Europe/Paris
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
 # Cloudflare Tunnel
 The `cloudflared` connector. It dials **out** to Cloudflare and Cloudflare
 routes public traffic back down that connection — so a service reaches the
 internet with no port forwarded, no static IP and no VPS.
 One tunnel serves every service; you don't need a copy of this per app.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env            # paste TUNNEL_TOKEN
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Get the token at **Dashboard → Zero Trust → Networks → Tunnels →** *(your
 tunnel)* **→ Configure**. The page shows a pre-filled `docker run … --token
 <TOKEN>` command — copy only the token part.
 Docs: <https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/networks/connectors/cloudflare-tunnel/>
 Then add routes in the same dashboard: **Public Hostname → Service**, e.g.
 `gitea.example.com → http://host.docker.internal:3000`.
 ## Ports
 **None.** Nothing listens on the host — that's the entire point. If you find
 yourself adding a `ports:` block here, something has been misunderstood.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **The token lives in `.env`, and compose refuses to start without it.** It's
 written `${TUNNEL_TOKEN:?…}` rather than with a default, because a
 blank token gives you a container that starts, retries, and quietly routes
 nothing. The token is a genuine credential — it authorises routing traffic
 into your network — so it never belongs in a committed file.
 **No `PUID`/`PGID`.** Unlike most services here, this isn't a LinuxServer
 image and doesn't understand those variables. It writes nothing to disk and
 needs no volumes, so there's no ownership to get right. `TZ` is kept only
 because it affects log timestamps.
 **`extra_hosts: host.docker.internal:host-gateway`.** Routes are configured in
 the dashboard, and the connector has to resolve whatever hostname you put
 there. This line lets you point at services published on the Docker host
 without hardcoding the LAN IP — which would otherwise break the day your
 router hands out a different lease.
 **`--no-autoupdate`.** The binary can update itself in place, which means the
 thing routing your traffic changes without you doing anything. Pinning that
 off makes updates a deliberate `docker compose pull`.
 **No config file, no volume.** This is the remotely-managed style of tunnel:
 routing lives in the Cloudflare dashboard, not on disk. The trade is that your
 routing config isn't in this repo — the alternative (`cloudflared tunnel
 create` plus a mounted `config.yml`) is version-controllable but more setup.
 ## Gotchas
 - **Don't put video through it.** Cloudflare's terms restrict serving large
  non-HTML content, and streaming a media library is the classic way to get an
  account flagged. Jellyfin belongs behind your own reverse proxy.
 - **~100 MB upload cap** on the free plan. Photo backup and file sync break on
  this, sometimes with nothing clearer than a `413`.
 - **The token can't be rotated.** If it leaks, delete the tunnel and create a
  new one.
 - **A dead tunnel looks like a DNS problem.** If a hostname stops resolving,
  check `docker compose logs cloudflared` before suspecting Cloudflare.
 ## Related
 - [When to use a tunnel, and when not to](../docs/cloudflare-tunnel.md) — the
  longer write-up, including the comparison against a VPS reverse proxy.
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md)
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — note Cloudflare
  Access can also sit in front of a tunnel; running both is usually redundant.
 ## Links
 - Connector docs: <https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/networks/connectors/cloudflare-tunnel/>
 - Image: <https://hub.docker.com/r/cloudflare/cloudflared>
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
 services:
  cloudflaretunnel:
    image: cloudflare/cloudflared:latest
    container_name: cloudflare-tunnel
    restart: unless-stopped
    command: tunnel --no-autoupdate run
    environment:
      # Only affects log timestamps here — nothing is written to disk.
      - TZ=${TZ:-Etc/UTC}
      # A real secret: it grants the ability to route traffic into your network.
      # Dashboard -> Zero Trust -> Networks -> Tunnels -> (tunnel) -> Configure
      - TUNNEL_TOKEN=${TUNNEL_TOKEN:?get it from Cloudflare Zero Trust > Networks > Tunnels > Configure}
    # No `ports:` and no PUID/PGID on purpose — see the README.
    # Lets dashboard routes reach services published on the Docker host, e.g.
    #   gitea.example.com -> http://host.docker.internal:3000
    # Drop this if you route to containers by name on a shared network.
    extra_hosts:
      - host.docker.internal:host-gateway
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # ─── Required ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Web UI password. There is no default and no "first run" setup: if neither
 # PASSWORD nor HASHED_PASSWORD is set, code-server serves an editor and a
 # terminal with NO authentication whatsoever.
 PASSWORD=
 # Instead of the plaintext above, you can store only a hash. It overrides
 # PASSWORD when set. Generate one with:
 #
 #   echo -n "yourpassword" | npx argon2-cli -e
 #
 # Then uncomment HASHED_PASSWORD in compose.yaml.
 #HASHED_PASSWORD=
 # ─── Sudo inside the container ──────────────────────────────────────
 # Set this if you want to install things from the built-in terminal. The image
 # is deliberately minimal -- no python, no pip, no compilers -- so anything
 # beyond editing needs apt:
 #
 #   sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y python3-pip
 #
 # Leaving it empty is safe and simply disables sudo; the init script tests for
 # a non-empty value, so empty is not an enabled blank password. It can be the
 # same as PASSWORD or different -- it only guards `sudo` inside the container.
 #
 # Be aware of what it grants: root in the container. That is a container, not
 # your host, but it is still root over anything you have mounted.
 SUDO_PASSWORD=
 # Store a hash instead of the plaintext. Takes priority over SUDO_PASSWORD.
 # Format is $type$salt$hash. Uncomment the matching line in compose.yaml.
 #SUDO_PASSWORD_HASH=
 # ─── Identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Files you create in the editor are owned by this user. `id -u` / `id -g`.
 # Defaulted to 1000/1000 in compose.yaml.
 #PUID=1000
 #PGID=1000
 #TZ=Europe/Paris
 # ─── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Settings, installed extensions, and the default workspace.
 #CONFIG_PATH=./config
 # Optional: existing code on the host to expose in the editor. Uncomment the
 # matching volume line in compose.yaml too.
 #PROJECTS_PATH=/srv/projects
 # ─── Ports and proxying ─────────────────────────────────────────────
 #PORT=8443
 #DEFAULT_WORKSPACE=/config/workspace
 # Only for subdomain port-forwarding (3000.code.example.com). Needs wildcard
 # DNS and a wildcard certificate; skip it if you don't need that.
 #PROXY_DOMAIN=code.example.com
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
 # code-server
 VS Code in a browser. Useful for editing on the NAS from a laptop, a tablet, or
 any machine you don't want to set a toolchain up on.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env            # PASSWORD is required
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:8443`. The password from `.env` is the only credential.
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 8443 | http | Editor UI (plain HTTP — put TLS in front of it) |
 ## Read this before exposing it
 code-server is not a document editor with a terminal bolted on. It **is** a
 shell, with a file browser, running as `PUID`/`PGID`, with network access to
 everything the container can reach. Treat exposing it exactly as you'd treat
 exposing SSH.
 Three consequences worth being deliberate about:
 **`PASSWORD` is required here** (`${PASSWORD:?…}`), which is a deviation from
 upstream's example. Their compose marks it `#optional`, and it is — but the
 docs also say: *"If PASSWORD or HASHED_PASSWORD is not provided, there will be
 no auth."* Optional-and-silently-open is the wrong default for something that
 hands out a shell, so this stack refuses to start without one.
 **`SUDO_PASSWORD` is how you install anything.** The image is deliberately
 minimal — no python, no pip, no compilers — so `sudo apt install python3-pip`
 is the normal first move, and that needs sudo enabled. It grants root *in the
 container*, which is a real boundary but not your host. Leave it empty if you
 only ever edit; the init script tests for a non-empty value, so empty means
 disabled rather than an enabled blank password.
 **Whatever you mount is executable, not just editable.** The commented
 `PROJECTS_PATH` line is genuinely convenient and genuinely a decision — mount
 your code, not your whole home directory. Never mount `/var/run/docker.sock`
 here; that converts a container password into root on the host.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **LinuxServer image**, so the usual `PUID`/`PGID`/`TZ` contract applies and
 files you create are owned by you rather than root. Same reasoning as
 [jellyfin](../jellyfin/) — one dialect across the stacks.
 **`HASHED_PASSWORD` is offered but commented.** `.env` is git-ignored, so a
 plaintext password there is not exposed, but the hash means the credential
 isn't sitting in a readable file at all. Generate one with
 `echo -n "yourpassword" | npx argon2-cli -e`. It overrides `PASSWORD` when set.
 **`PROXY_DOMAIN` is commented out.** It only matters if you want forwarded
 ports served as subdomains — port 3000 as `3000.code.example.com` — which needs
 a wildcard DNS record and a wildcard certificate. Without it, forwarded ports
 still work through the editor's own proxy path.
 **`DEFAULT_WORKSPACE` is set** so the editor opens somewhere useful instead of
 an empty file picker on every visit.
 ## What survives a rebuild, and what doesn't
 `/config` is the app user's home directory — `abc:x:911:1001::/config` — and
 it's the only persisted path. That single fact decides how you should install
 things:
 | Installed with | Lands in | Survives `docker compose up` after a pull? |
 |---|---|---|
 | `sudo apt install …` | `/usr/…` | **No** — gone with the old container |
 | `pip install --user …` | `/config/.local` | Yes |
 | VS Code extensions | `/config` | Yes |
 | Anything in your workspace | `/config/workspace` | Yes |
 So `sudo apt install python3-pip` has to be repeated after every image update,
 while the packages you then `pip install --user` stay put. Prefer `--user`
 installs, and keep a note of the apt packages you need so you can replay them.
 If a toolchain matters enough that re-running apt annoys you, build a small
 image `FROM lscr.io/linuxserver/code-server` with the packages baked in.
 ## Gotchas
 - **Extensions live in `/config`.** They're part of what to back up, and
  they're why the config directory grows.
 - **The VS Code Marketplace isn't available.** code-server uses Open VSX, so a
  few Microsoft-licensed extensions are missing. Most have equivalents.
 - **Port forwarding is per-session.** Ports you open inside the editor are
  reachable through it, not published on the host.
 - **A container password is a weaker boundary than it looks.** Anyone who logs
  in can reach every service on your Docker network directly by name.
 ## Exposing it
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — the minimum. Never
  serve this over plain HTTP off your LAN; the password crosses the wire.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — a good fit here.
  Forward auth in front of code-server means an attacker needs to get past
  Authentik before reaching a login form that leads to a shell.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — works, and avoids opening a port.
  Pair it with Cloudflare Access rather than relying on the password alone.
 ## Links
 - Image docs: <https://docs.linuxserver.io/images/docker-code-server/>
 - Upstream: <https://github.com/coder/code-server>
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
 services:
  code-server:
    image: lscr.io/linuxserver/code-server:latest
    container_name: code-server
    restart: unless-stopped
    environment:
      - PUID=${PUID:-1000}
      - PGID=${PGID:-1000}
      - TZ=${TZ:-Etc/UTC}
      # REQUIRED. With neither PASSWORD nor HASHED_PASSWORD set, code-server
      # starts with NO authentication -- an editor and a shell, open to anyone
      # who can reach the port.
      - PASSWORD=${PASSWORD:?set one - without it code-server has no auth at all}
      # Overrides PASSWORD when set. Use it to keep the plaintext out of .env.
      #- HASHED_PASSWORD=${HASHED_PASSWORD}
      # Enables `sudo` in the built-in terminal -- needed to apt-install
      # anything, since the image ships no python/pip/compilers. Empty is safe
      # and simply leaves sudo disabled: the init script tests `-n`, so an
      # empty value is not the same as an enabled blank password.
      - SUDO_PASSWORD=${SUDO_PASSWORD:-}
      # Takes priority over SUDO_PASSWORD if you'd rather store only a hash.
      #- SUDO_PASSWORD_HASH=${SUDO_PASSWORD_HASH}
      # Only needed if you serve forwarded ports on subdomains, so that
      # port 3000 becomes 3000.code.example.com. Requires a wildcard DNS
      # record and a wildcard certificate.
      #- PROXY_DOMAIN=${PROXY_DOMAIN}
      - DEFAULT_WORKSPACE=${DEFAULT_WORKSPACE:-/config/workspace}
      #- PWA_APPNAME=${PWA_APPNAME:-code-server}
    volumes:
      # Settings, extensions, and the default workspace. Back this up.
      - ${CONFIG_PATH:-./config}:/config
      # Code that lives elsewhere on the host. Whatever you mount here is
      # editable -- and runnable -- from the browser.
      #- ${PROJECTS_PATH}:/config/workspace/projects
    ports:
      - "${PORT:-8443}:8443"
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # ─── Required ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Password for the account named in init/copyparty.conf. That config grants
 # access to this account ONLY -- there is no anonymous access.
 #
 #   openssl rand -base64 18
 #
 CP_PASSWORD=
 # The directory to share. Bound to /w inside the container, which is what
 # init/copyparty.conf serves at the webroot.
 # Add `:ro` to the volume line in compose.yaml for a download-only server.
 SHARE_PATH=/srv/downloads
 # ─── Optional ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Username. Change it here AND in the `accs:` block of init/copyparty.conf --
 # the two must match or the account has no permissions.
 #CP_USER=admin
 # Index, thumbnails and copyparty's own config dir. Keeps state out of the
 # shared folder. Back this up.
 #DATA_PATH=./data
 # The image runs as root unless told otherwise and reads no PUID/PGID; these
 # feed Docker's `user:` directive. Must be able to read/write SHARE_PATH.
 #PUID=1000
 #PGID=1000
 #TZ=Europe/Paris
 #PORT=3923
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
 # copyparty
 File server with an unusual amount packed in: resumable uploads, dedup, a media
 index with thumbnails, share links, and WebDAV/FTP/SFTP/TFTP on the side. One
 Python process, no database server.
 Overlaps with [filebrowser](../filebrowser/) — that one is a tidy file manager,
 this one is a transfer workhorse. Uploading 40 GB over a flaky connection is
 where the difference shows.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 echo "CP_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -base64 18)" >> .env
 $EDITOR .env            # set SHARE_PATH
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:3923` and log in as `admin` with that password.
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 3923 | http | Web UI, WebDAV, and the API |
 ## Why it looks like this
 **No anonymous access.** Upstream's example config grants `rw: *` — read *and
 write* to anybody who can reach the port. That's a sensible LAN dropbox and a
 poor default for anything else, so this config gives access to one named
 account and nothing to the public. Verified: anonymous gets `403`, the account
 gets `200`.
 **The password is not in the config file.** copyparty's `[accounts]` section
 takes `user: password` in plaintext, which is fine on your own disk but not in
 a git repo. Accounts are passed as a command-line argument instead, so
 `CP_PASSWORD` stays in `.env`:
 ```yaml
 command: ["-a", "${CP_USER:-admin}:${CP_PASSWORD:?...}"]
 ```
 The username there must match the `accs:` block in
 [`init/copyparty.conf`](init/copyparty.conf), or the account exists with no
 permissions and every page looks empty.
 **`XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/data`.** `/cfg` is mounted read-only, so without this
 copyparty can't write its config directory and falls back to `/tmp` — logging a
 warning most people scroll past. The consequence is that **the filekeys behind
 every share link regenerate on each restart**, quietly breaking links you've
 handed out.
 **`hist: /data/hist`.** By default the index and thumbnail cache go into a
 `.hist` directory *inside the folder you're sharing*. Redirecting it keeps your
 media directory as you left it.
 **The `ac` image.** Variants differ by what's bundled — `min` is the bare
 server, `ac` adds ffmpeg for thumbnails and media tags, others add more. `ac` is
 what the config's `e2ts` needs.
 ## Gotchas
 - **Inline comments need two spaces before the `#`.** With one, the `#` and
  everything after becomes part of the value. copyparty warns at startup rather
  than failing, so it's easy to miss.
 - **Share links bypass authentication by design.** That's the point of them,
  but a leaked link is public access to that file.
 - **`e2dsa` indexes on first start.** For a large share, expect the first boot
  to churn; uploads are blocked while it runs and it says so in the log.
 - **It is CPU-hungry, and on a small box you will feel it.** On my Intel N100
  this is the service that shows up in `top`, not the media server. I still run
  it and still want it, but I stop the container when I'm not actively moving
  files rather than leave it idling — on a four-core low-TDP chip that headroom
  is worth more than instant availability. The expensive parts are the ones
  this config asks for: `e2dsa` walking the share and the media tag/thumbnail
  work that the `ac` image exists to provide. Nothing is misconfigured — it's
  what the feature set costs. If you want it always-on there, drop to the `min`
  image and turn off `e2ts`, and accept losing thumbnails.
 - **Back up `DATA_PATH`.** It holds the index and the filekeys that make share
  links stable.
 - **Version-check is opt-in.** Uncomment `vc-url` and `vc-exit` in the config
  and copyparty refuses to start on a version with a known advisory — worth it
  if you expose this.
 ## Exposing it
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — needed; the built-in
  TLS uses a self-signed certificate.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — copyparty has its
  own accounts, so forward auth means two logins. Worth it anyway if this faces
  the internet.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — **think first.** Large uploads
  are the reason to run copyparty, and the tunnel's ~100 MB body cap is exactly
  what breaks.
 ## Links
 - Upstream: <https://github.com/9001/copyparty>
 - The compose example this started from:
  <https://github.com/9001/copyparty/blob/hovudstraum/docs/examples/docker/basic-docker-compose/docker-compose.yml>
 - Image: <https://hub.docker.com/r/copyparty/ac>
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
 services:
  copyparty:
    # Variants differ by what's bundled: `min` is the bare server, `ac` adds
    # ffmpeg for thumbnails and media tags, `iv`/`dj` add more. `ac` is the
    # sensible default and what the config's e2ts flag needs.
    image: copyparty/ac:1.20.21
    container_name: copyparty
    restart: unless-stopped
    # Runs as root unless told otherwise. It reads no PUID/PGID.
    user: "${PUID:-1000}:${PGID:-1000}"
    # The thumbnailer gets ~10s to finish after the stop signal.
    stop_grace_period: 15s
    environment:
      - TZ=${TZ:-Etc/UTC}
      # Keeps log lines from being buffered.
      - PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
      # Without this, copyparty cannot write its config dir (/cfg is read-only)
      # and falls back to /tmp -- which silently regenerates the filekeys behind
      # every share link on each restart.
      - XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/data
      # Replace NOPE with 2 to enable mimalloc: faster, roughly double the RAM.
      - LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/libmimalloc-secure.so.NOPE
    # Accounts live here, not in the committed config file. The name must match
    # the one in init/copyparty.conf's `accs:` block.
    command: ["-a", "${CP_USER:-admin}:${CP_PASSWORD:?set a password - the config grants access to this account only}"]
    volumes:
      - ./init:/cfg:ro
      # Index, thumbnails and copyparty's own config dir. Back this up.
      - ${DATA_PATH:-./data}:/data
      # What you're sharing. Add `:ro` for a download-only server.
      - "${SHARE_PATH:?set SHARE_PATH to the directory you want to share}:/w"
    ports:
      - "${PORT:-3923}:3923"
    healthcheck:
      # The "/._" suffix matches copyparty's default log filter, so the probe
      # doesn't fill the log.
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget --spider -q 127.0.0.1:3923/?reset=/._"]
      interval: 1m
      timeout: 2s
      retries: 5
      start_period: 15s
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
 # copyparty configuration. Everything in /cfg is loaded by the image's own
 # initcfg, which also sets `chdir: /w`.
 #
 # Not YAML despite appearances -- indentation matters, `key: value` for options
 # that take one, bare words for flags.
 #
 # Inline comments need AT LEAST TWO SPACES before the `#`. With one space the
 # `#` and everything after it becomes part of the value, and copyparty warns
 # about it at startup rather than failing.
 #
 # No [accounts] section here on purpose: accounts are passed on the command
 # line from .env, so no password is ever committed. See compose.yaml.
 [global]
  e2dsa             # index files and scan the filesystem
  e2ts              # read media tags; needs the "ac" image, which has ffmpeg
  # Keep the index out of the shared folder. Without this, copyparty creates
  # a .hist directory inside whatever you are sharing.
  hist: /data/hist
  # ipa: lan        # reject connections from outside the LAN
  # df: 16          # refuse uploads when under 16 GB free
  # grid            # thumbnail grid by default
  # theme: 2        # monokai
  # Warn -- and with vc-exit, refuse to start -- if the running version has a
  # known advisory. Off by default upstream; worth it for anything exposed.
  # vc-url: https://api.copyparty.eu/advisories
  # vc-exit
 [/]                 # volume at the webroot
  /w                # serving /w, which compose binds to your SHARE_PATH
  accs:
    # Upstream's example uses `rw: *`, i.e. read-write for anonymous visitors.
    # That is a reasonable LAN dropbox and a bad default for anything else, so
    # only the account created in compose.yaml gets access here.
    rwmda: admin    # read-write-move-delete-admin
  flags:
    e2ds
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
 # Single sign-on with Authentik
-One login for everything self-hosted here, and one place to revoke it. The
+TODO: fill in as you go. Outline below so the shape is decided in advance.
 services themselves stay unaware — nothing in any `compose.yaml` in this repo
 mentions Authentik.
 ## Two ways to protect a service
@@ -18,210 +16,30 @@ fallback.
 ## Native OIDC — the shape
-Use this wherever the app supports it. You get real accounts, real logout, and
+TODO: provider + application setup in Authentik, then the four values every
-clients that aren't browsers keep working.
+app asks for:
-### In Authentik
+- Issuer / discovery URL
 - Client ID
 - Client secret → `.env`, never committed
 - Redirect URI
-**Applications → Create**, provider type **OAuth2/OpenID Connect**. Three things
+## Forward auth — the shape
 to note as you go:
- the application **slug** — it appears in half the URLs below
+TODO: the Caddy snippet, and which services you apply it to.
 - the **client ID** and **client secret**
 - pick a **signing key**, or the app can't validate the token it gets back
 Then add the **redirect URIs**, which is where this usually goes wrong — see the
 gotchas.
 ### The four values every app asks for
 | Value | Where it comes from |
 |-------|--------------------|
 | Issuer / discovery URL | `https://authentik.example.com/application/o/<slug>/` |
 | Client ID | Authentik, on the provider |
 | Client secret | Authentik → the service's `.env`, never committed |
 | Redirect URI | The app tells you — don't guess |
 Most apps take the issuer URL and discover the rest themselves; Audiobookshelf
 calls this **Auto-populate**. When one wants the endpoints spelled out
 individually:
 | Endpoint | Path |
 |----------|------|
 | OpenID configuration | `/application/o/<slug>/.well-known/openid-configuration` |
 | Authorization | `/application/o/authorize/` |
 | Token | `/application/o/token/` |
 | User info | `/application/o/userinfo/` |
 | End session | `/application/o/<slug>/end-session/` |
 | JWKS | `/application/o/<slug>/jwks/` |
 Note which paths carry the slug and which don't: authorize, token and userinfo
 are shared across every application, while discovery, JWKS and logout are
 per-application. Putting the slug where it doesn't belong gives a 404 that looks
 like the provider is broken.
 Worked examples in this repo:
 [audiobookshelf](../audiobookshelf/README.md#single-sign-on-with-authentik) and
 [jellyfin](../jellyfin/README.md#single-sign-on-with-authentik).
 ## Forward auth — putting an app with no SSO behind Authentik
 This is the fallback, and it's what most self-hosted apps need. The app itself
 learns nothing and changes nothing: **Caddy asks Authentik whether to allow the
 request before it ever reaches the container.** An app with no accounts at all,
 or one with its own login you can't replace, ends up behind a real SSO login
 page either way.
 ### In Authentik
 1. **Providers → Create → Proxy Provider**, mode **Forward auth (single
   application)**. The external host is the public URL — `https://firefly.domain.com`.
 2. **Applications → Create**, and bind it to that provider.
 3. **Outposts** — add the application to an outpost. The built-in *embedded
   outpost* is the one already listening on port **9000**, which is what the
   Caddyfile below points at.
 Step 3 is the one that gets forgotten. Provider and application exist, the
 Caddyfile is right, and every request still fails because the outpost was never
 told the application is its responsibility.
 ### In Caddy
 ```caddyfile
 firefly.domain.com {
    # directive execution order is only as stated if enclosed with route.
    route {
        # always forward outpost path to actual outpost
        reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* http://127.0.0.1:9000
        # forward authentication to outpost
        forward_auth http://127.0.0.1:9000 {
            uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
            # capitalization of the headers is important, otherwise they will be empty
            copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Entitlements X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name X-Authentik-Uid X-Authentik-Jwt X-Authentik-Meta-Jwks X-Authentik-Meta-Outpost X-Authentik-Meta-Provider X-Authentik-Meta-App X-Authentik-Meta-Version
            # optional, in this config trust all private ranges, should probably be set to the outposts IP
            trusted_proxies private_ranges
        }
        # actual site configuration below, for example
        reverse_proxy 10.10.0.2:8564
    }
 }
 ```
 Only the last line changes per service: swap the address and port, and the
 hostname at the top. Everything between is identical for every app.
 `10.10.0.2` there is a **private address, not a public one** — in this setup a
 WireGuard host, so Caddy reaches the app over the tunnel rather than across the
 internet. Whatever address your proxy uses to reach the service goes there: a
 LAN IP, a WireGuard or Tailscale peer, or a container name if Caddy runs in the
 same Compose project. The only requirement is that Caddy can reach it and the
 outside world can't.
 ### Why each piece is there
 **`route { }` is not optional.** Caddy normally executes directives in its own
 fixed order, not the order you wrote them. Without `route`, the final
 `reverse_proxy` can run before `forward_auth`, and the app is served to
 unauthenticated visitors. The config *looks* correct and protects nothing —
 which is the worst possible failure mode for this feature, so wrap it and check
 in a private window.
 **The `/outpost.goauthentik.io/*` line comes first** because the login flow
 itself lives on that path. If it fell through to the app, the browser would be
 sent to a URL the app doesn't serve and the redirect loop would never resolve.
 **`copy_headers` capitalization is load-bearing** — get it wrong and the headers
 arrive empty rather than missing, so an app that reads them sees a blank
 username instead of an error.
 **`127.0.0.1:9000` assumes Caddy and Authentik are on the same host.** If Caddy
 runs on a VPS and Authentik on the NAS, this is the line to change — and
 `trusted_proxies private_ranges` should then name the outpost's actual address
 rather than trusting every private range.
 ### What you give up
 - **The app doesn't know who you are.** It sees an authenticated-by-someone
  request. Apps with their own accounts still show their own login, so you get
  **two logins** — Authentik, then the app. Some apps can read the
  `X-Authentik-*` headers and skip theirs; most can't.
 - **Non-browser clients break.** Mobile apps, API clients and anything doing
  `curl` can't complete an interactive login flow. This is why Jellyfin and
  Audiobookshelf use native OIDC instead — see
  [jellyfin](../jellyfin/README.md) and
  [audiobookshelf](../audiobookshelf/README.md). If a service has an API you
  actually call, forward auth in front of it will stop that too.
 - **It is all-or-nothing per hostname.** Every path behind that block requires
  login, including webhooks and health checks.
 ### Where I use it
 - **[Firefly III](../firefly/README.md)** — the config above is verbatim what
  runs in front of it. Firefly keeps its own login underneath, so it's two
  logins, and for bank data that's a trade worth making.
 - **[copyparty](../copyparty/README.md)** and other apps with their own account
  system, where the second login is the price of not exposing the app's login
  form to the internet.
 Prefer native OIDC wherever the app supports it. Reach for this when it doesn't.
 ## Groups and roles
-The mechanism is the same everywhere: Authentik puts your group membership in
+TODO: how you map Authentik groups to per-app roles, and the admin/user
-the token, and the app decides what that means.
+split.
 **You usually don't need a custom mapping.** The standard `profile` scope
 already includes group membership, so most apps see your groups with nothing
 configured. Reach for a custom **scope mapping** (Customization → Property
 Mappings) only when an app wants the claim under a different name or in a
 different shape.
 **Each app consumes it differently**, and that's the part to check per service —
 Audiobookshelf has group and permission claim fields under its OpenID settings;
 the Jellyfin SSO-Auth plugin has its own role and admin filters. There is no
 single setting that makes "the admins group" mean administrator everywhere.
 **The split worth setting up:** one group for ordinary access, one for admin,
 and grant the app's admin role only to the second. The reason is the failure
 mode below — if everyone who can log in is an admin, an SSO misconfiguration
 isn't just an outage, it's an escalation.
 TODO: the actual group names and per-app role mapping used here, once the same
 shape has survived a few services.
 ## Gotchas
- **Keep a local fallback admin until the flow is proven.** If the only account
+TODO: collect these as you hit them. Known ones worth writing down:
-  that can administer an app is behind SSO and SSO breaks, you have locked
+
-  yourself out of the thing you need in order to fix it. Prove the login works,
+- Locking yourself out of an app whose only admin is now behind SSO — keep a
-  in a private window, *before* removing the local account.
+  local fallback admin until the flow is proven.
- **Redirect URI mismatches surface as a generic error** that never names the
+- Redirect URI mismatches, which usually surface as a generic error.
  URI. Read the exact URIs off the application's own settings page rather than
  copying them from a guide — Audiobookshelf prints them, and
  [its README](../audiobookshelf/README.md#the-redirect-uris-are-where-this-goes-wrong)
  documents a case where the published guide was wrong for that install.
 - **Behind TLS, apps build `http://` redirect URLs.** The proxy terminates TLS,
  the app sees a plain HTTP request, and the callback it generates is insecure —
  so the login fails halfway through. Every app has its own name for the fix;
  Jellyfin's SSO-Auth plugin calls it
  [Scheme Override](../jellyfin/README.md#the-setting-that-cost-me-the-time).
  Firefly's `TRUSTED_PROXIES=**` is the same class of setting.
 - **`email_verified` is `False` by default.** Some apps refuse to authenticate a
  user whose email isn't marked verified, and the resulting error rarely says
  so. Fix it in the scope mapping.
 - **Forward auth breaks everything that isn't a browser.** Mobile apps and API
  clients can't complete an interactive login. Check what talks to a service
  before putting it behind forward auth — this is the single biggest reason to
  prefer native OIDC.
 - **Adding the application to an outpost is a separate step** from creating the
  provider and the application, and forgetting it fails in a way that looks like
  a Caddy problem.
 - **The client secret belongs in the service's `.env`**, which is git-ignored.
  Never in `compose.yaml`, which is committed.
 ## Related
@@ -33,19 +33,15 @@ TODO: your preferred flow — dashboard-created tunnel vs. `cloudflared tunnel
 create`. The dashboard route is easier to show on video; the CLI route is
 easier to keep in version control.
 The connector itself is a service in this repo — see
 [`cloudflare-tunnel/`](../cloudflare-tunnel/) for the compose file, the token
 setup and the gotchas. In short:
 ```yaml
 services:
-  cloudflaretunnel:
+  cloudflared:
    image: cloudflare/cloudflared:latest
-    container_name: cloudflare-tunnel
+    container_name: cloudflared
    restart: unless-stopped
    command: tunnel --no-autoupdate run
    environment:
-      - TUNNEL_TOKEN=${TUNNEL_TOKEN:?}
+      - TUNNEL_TOKEN=${CLOUDFLARE_TUNNEL_TOKEN}
 ```
 The tunnel token is a **real secret** — it grants the ability to route
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # ─── Required ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # The directory to browse. Mounted at /srv inside the container, which is
 # what init/config.yaml points at.
 #
 # Add `:ro` to the volume line in compose.yaml if you want a viewer rather
 # than a file manager -- worth considering, since anyone who logs in can
 # delete whatever they can see.
 BROWSE_PATH=/srv/downloads
 # ─── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # SQLite database: users, shares, search index. Back this up. Small.
 #DATA_PATH=./data
 # ─── Identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # The image runs as its own non-root user, uid/gid 1000, and reads no
 # PUID/PGID -- these feed Docker's `user:` directive instead. They must be
 # able to read BROWSE_PATH and write DATA_PATH.
 #PUID=1000
 #PGID=1000
 #TZ=Europe/Paris
 # ─── Ports ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #PORT=3672
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
 # File Browser
 Web file manager for a single directory tree — browse, preview, upload,
 download, share links. Handy for reaching a downloads folder from a phone
 without exposing SMB or SSH.
 This is **[FileBrowser Quantum](https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser)**,
 the maintained fork. See below for why not the original.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env            # BROWSE_PATH is required
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:3672` and log in as **`admin` / `admin`** — then change the
 password immediately, see below.
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 3672 | http | Web UI (container listens on 80) |
 ## Change the default password first
 First start creates an admin account with a default password and says so:
 ```
 [INFO ] Resetting admin user to default username and password.
 ```
 Change it in the UI under user settings, or from the CLI. **The database is
 locked while the server runs**, so the container has to be stopped first:
 ```bash
 docker compose stop
 docker compose run --rm filebrowser set -u "admin,your-new-password" -a
 docker compose start
 ```
 Running that against a live container fails with *"the database is locked,
 please close all other instances"*, which is easy to misread as corruption.
 ## Why not `filebrowser/filebrowser`
 The original project was wound down on **2026-09-01**. Its own binary announced
 it on every start:
 ```
 NOTICE: File Browser is being wound down.
 NOTICE: The project is archived on 2026-09-01, after which there will be no
 NOTICE: further releases and no security fixes.
 ```
 At that point its advisory page listed around 30 published issues, including a
 high-severity one where recursive copy, rename and delete ignored rules that
 should have denied access to descendants. Those are now permanent.
 Quantum is the actively developed fork. It keeps the same idea but has its own
 configuration format — a YAML file rather than `FB_*` environment variables —
 so it is not a drop-in swap of the image name.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **The config is a committed file, not environment variables.** Quantum reads a
 YAML config and exits `FATAL` if it can't find one. Without
 `FILEBROWSER_CONFIG` it looks for `config.yaml` *inside the data directory*,
 which means the file you must write by hand and the database it generates end
 up in the same place. Pointing it at `/config/config.yaml` keeps the two
 separate: [`init/config.yaml`](init/config.yaml) is version-controlled and
 mounted read-only, `DATA_PATH` holds only generated state.
 **`minLength: 5` in the config is deliberate.** Raise it and the first start
 dies before serving anything:
 ```
 [FATAL] store.Users.Save: password must be at least 8 characters long
 ```
 That's the *default admin* being created — its password is shorter than the
 limit you just set. Raise `minLength` only after setting a real password.
 **No `PUID`/`PGID`.** The image runs as its own `filebrowser` user (uid/gid
 1000) and reads neither those nor `UID`/`GID`. Ownership is set with Docker's
 `user:` directive, the same as [audiobookshelf](../audiobookshelf/).
 **One source, mounted at `/srv`.** `config.yaml` declares `sources: [/srv]` and
 the compose file binds your directory there, so the path inside the container
 never changes and the config stays generic.
 ## Gotchas
 - **Anyone who logs in can delete anything they can see.** Mount `BROWSE_PATH`
  with `:ro` if you only want to look and download.
 - **Share links bypass login by design.** That's the feature, but it means a
  leaked link is public access to that file.
 - **The database is locked while the container runs** — user management needs
  it stopped.
 - **Back up `DATA_PATH`.** It holds users and share links; losing it means
  recreating both.
 - **A missing config file looks like a broken config file.** The error names
  `Sources` as invalid rather than saying the file is absent.
 - **Tags are `1.5.3-stable`, not `v1.5.3`.** The `v` prefix 404s, and `stable`
  and `latest` are moving tags.
 ## Running it on OpenMediaVault
 OMV's compose plugin deploys the compose file and the env file, nothing else.
 Two things follow, and both cost me a round trip.
 **Put `config.yaml` in `init/`, not the stack root.** The compose mounts
 `./init/config.yaml`, so that exact path must exist as a *file* before the
 first start. Docker creates a **directory** for a missing bind-mount source,
 and filebrowser then reports a validation failure rather than a missing file:
 ```
 could not validate config: Key: 'Settings.Server.Sources'
  Error:Field validation for 'Sources' failed on the 'required' tag
 ```
 That message sends you looking for a mistake in your config when the config
 isn't being read at all. Check the host first:
 ```bash
 stat -c '%F %n' init/config.yaml     # must say "regular file"
 ```
 If it says `directory`, `rmdir` it, put the real file there, and **recreate**
 the container — a restart isn't enough, the mount is fixed at creation.
 **Make `DATA_PATH` writable by `PUID:PGID`.** Docker creates it as root, but
 the container runs as your `PUID:PGID` — which on OMV is often `1000:100`
 (the `users` group), not `1000:1000`. Otherwise:
 ```
 [FATAL] could not open database: open /data/database.db: permission denied
 ```
 ```bash
 chown -R 1000:100 data
 ```
 Also: OMV names the env file `filebrowser.env`, so manual `docker compose`
 commands fail on `BROWSE_PATH` unless you pass `--env-file filebrowser.env`.
 Use plain `docker exec` / `docker logs` for one-offs.
 ## Exposing it
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — the minimum.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — worth it here.
  Forward auth means a stranger has to get past Authentik before reaching a
  login form that guards your filesystem.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — mind the ~100 MB upload cap, and
  don't route large media downloads through it.
 ## Links
 - Upstream: <https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser>
 - Image: `ghcr.io/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser`
 - The wound-down original: <https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories>
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
 services:
  filebrowser:
    # FileBrowser Quantum -- the maintained fork. The original
    # filebrowser/filebrowser was wound down on 2026-09-01 with ~30 unfixed
    # security advisories; see the README before reaching for it again.
    image: ghcr.io/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser:1.5.3-stable
    container_name: filebrowser
    restart: unless-stopped
    # The image already runs as its own non-root `filebrowser` user, uid/gid
    # 1000. It reads no PUID/PGID, so ownership is set the Docker way. Change
    # this if the files it must read are owned by someone else.
    user: "${PUID:-1000}:${PGID:-1000}"
    environment:
      - TZ=${TZ:-Etc/UTC}
      # Without these it looks for config.yaml *inside* the data directory and
      # exits FATAL when it is missing. Splitting them keeps the committed
      # config separate from the database it generates.
      - FILEBROWSER_CONFIG=/config/config.yaml
      - FILEBROWSER_DATABASE=/data/database.db
    volumes:
      - ./init/config.yaml:/config/config.yaml:ro
      # SQLite database: users, shares, the search index. Back this up.
      - ${DATA_PATH:-./data}:/data
      # The directory you actually want to browse. Add `:ro` to make this a
      # viewer rather than a file manager.
      - "${BROWSE_PATH:?set BROWSE_PATH to the directory you want to browse}:/srv"
    ports:
      - "${PORT:-3672}:80"
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
 # FileBrowser Quantum configuration.
 #
 # Mounted read-only at /config/config.yaml; the container is pointed at it with
 # FILEBROWSER_CONFIG. `./filebrowser -c` inside the image prints the full
 # annotated default if you want to see every available option.
 server:
  port: 80
  baseURL: "/"
  logging:
    - levels: "info|warning|error"
  # What gets browsed. The compose file bind-mounts your directory here.
  sources:
    - path: "/srv"
 auth:
  methods:
    password:
      enabled: true
      # Leave at 5. The first run creates a default admin whose password is
      # shorter than 8 characters, and raising this makes that creation fail
      # with a FATAL before the server ever starts. Raise it only after you
      # have set a real password -- see the README.
      minLength: 5
      # No self-registration. Users are created by an admin.
      signup: false
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 #
 # ─── READ THIS FIRST ────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # This stack is different from the others in this repo. Elsewhere, .env
 # holds a handful of variables that Compose interpolates into
 # compose.yaml. Here, `env_file: .env` hands the whole file to the
 # application, so .env *is* Firefly III's configuration file.
 #
 # Because of that, upstream's instruction is to start from their full
 # file rather than write one by hand:
 #
 #   wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/firefly-iii/firefly-iii/main/.env.example -O .env
 #
 # Then change the values below. This file is the list of what to change
 # and why -- not a drop-in replacement for theirs.
 # ─── Required: the two 32-character secrets ─────────────────────────
 # Both must be EXACTLY 32 characters. Not "at least" -- exactly. Firefly
 # rejects anything else, and the cron token silently 404s.
 #
 #   openssl rand -base64 24 | cut -c1-32
 #
 APP_KEY=
 # The cron container authenticates with this and nothing else -- it is a
 # bearer token in a URL path. Treat it as a password.
 STATIC_CRON_TOKEN=
 # ─── Required: who you are ──────────────────────────────────────────
 # Used as the "from" address and shown in the admin pages.
 SITE_OWNER=you@example.com
 # The external URL people actually type. Firefly builds links from it,
 # so a wrong value breaks password resets the same way it does anywhere.
 APP_URL=http://localhost:8564
 # Change this value to your preferred time zone. It also decides when the
 # cron job runs -- see the README.
 TZ=Europe/Paris
 # ─── Database ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # DB_HOST is the compose SERVICE name, not the container name.
 # DB_PASSWORD must match MYSQL_PASSWORD in .db.env, or the app boots and
 # then fails every request with a connection error.
 DB_CONNECTION=mysql
 DB_HOST=db
 DB_PORT=3306
 DB_DATABASE=firefly
 DB_USERNAME=firefly
 DB_PASSWORD=
 # ─── Behind a reverse proxy ─────────────────────────────────────────
 # Upstream's own comment: "Set it to ** and reverse proxies work just
 # fine." Without it Firefly sees the proxy's IP as the client and builds
 # http:// links behind your TLS.
 TRUSTED_PROXIES=**
 # ─── Optional ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #DEFAULT_LANGUAGE=en_US
 # Defaults to `log`, which writes mail to the log instead of sending it.
 # Fine for a single-user install -- you never need a password reset email
 # if you are also the admin.
 #MAIL_MAILER=log
@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
 # Firefly III
 Personal finance manager: accounts, budgets, bills and recurring transactions,
 with a double-entry ledger underneath. Self-hosted, so your bank data stays on
 your disk instead of in someone's analytics pipeline.
 Two web UIs come with this stack — Firefly itself, and a separate **Data
 Importer** that pulls transactions in from CSV files, Nordigen/GoCardless or
 Spectre.
 ## Quick start
 Firefly needs **three** env files, not one. Only `.env` has an example in this
 repo — the other two are three lines each and are printed below.
 ```bash
 # 1. Firefly's own configuration. Start from upstream's full file:
 wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/firefly-iii/firefly-iii/main/.env.example -O .env
 $EDITOR .env            # see .env.example here for what to change
 # 2. Generate the two secrets. Both must be EXACTLY 32 characters:
 openssl rand -base64 24 | cut -c1-32   # -> APP_KEY
 openssl rand -base64 24 | cut -c1-32   # -> STATIC_CRON_TOKEN
 # 3. The database credentials:
 cat > .db.env <<'EOF'
 MYSQL_RANDOM_ROOT_PASSWORD=yes
 MYSQL_USER=firefly
 MYSQL_PASSWORD=change_me
 MYSQL_DATABASE=firefly
 EOF
 # 4. The importer (delete the service from compose.yaml if you don't want it):
 cat > .importer.env <<'EOF'
 FIREFLY_III_URL=http://app:8080
 VANITY_URL=http://localhost:8564
 TRUSTED_PROXIES=**
 EOF
 # 5. Wire up the cron token — see "The cron job" below. This step is manual.
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 `MYSQL_PASSWORD` in `.db.env` and `DB_PASSWORD` in `.env` are the same password
 written twice. They must match.
 Open `http://<host>:8564`, register, and the first account created becomes the
 admin. There's no separate admin bootstrap step.
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 8564 | http | Firefly III web UI and API (container listens on 8080) |
 | 8566 | http | Data Importer web UI (container listens on 8080) |
 MariaDB is reachable only on the internal `firefly_iii` network.
 ## The cron job
 **This is the part everyone skips, and the failure is silent.** Firefly does not
 schedule anything itself — the `app` container serves HTTP and nothing else.
 Recurring transactions, auto-budgets and periodic housekeeping only happen when
 something calls the cron endpoint:
 ```
 GET http://app:8080/api/v1/cron/<STATIC_CRON_TOKEN>
 ```
 That is what the fourth container is for. It's a bare `alpine` running `crond`
 with one entry, hitting that URL at 03:00 daily.
 Skip this and nothing announces itself. The app works, the UI is responsive, and
 your recurring transactions simply never appear. You notice weeks later when a
 month is missing its rent entry.
 ### Activating it
 The token is a bearer credential in a URL path, and it must be **exactly 32
 characters**. Anything else is rejected.
 In the compose file here, the cron service has **no `env_file:`**, so the token
 is not an environment variable it can read — it's baked into the crontab line as
 the literal string `REPLACEME`:
 ```yaml
 command: sh -c "echo \"0 3 * * * wget -qO- http://app:8080/api/v1/cron/REPLACEME\" | crontab - && crond -f -L /dev/stdout"
 ```
 So activation is two edits that must agree:
 1. Set `STATIC_CRON_TOKEN=<your 32 chars>` in `.env` (the **app** validates
   against this).
 2. Replace `REPLACEME` in `compose.yaml` with **the same 32 characters** (the
   **cron container** sends this).
 Get them out of sync and the request 404s every night, forever, with no sign in
 the Firefly UI.
 ### Upstream's newer version is better — consider switching
 Current upstream avoids the hardcoded token entirely by giving the cron
 container the same `.env` and letting the shell expand it (`$$` escapes the `$`
 so Compose passes it through rather than interpolating it):
 ```yaml
  cron:
    image: alpine
    restart: always
    container_name: firefly_iii_cron
    env_file: .env
    command: ["sh", "-c", "apk add tzdata && \
      (ln -s /usr/share/zoneinfo/$$TZ /etc/localtime || true) && \
      echo \"0 3 * * * wget -qO- http://app:8080/api/v1/cron/$$STATIC_CRON_TOKEN;echo\" \
      | crontab - && \
      crond -f -L /dev/stdout"]
    networks:
      - firefly_iii
    depends_on:
      - app
 ```
 Two real improvements: the token lives in exactly one place, and `apk add
 tzdata` plus the `localtime` symlink make "03:00" mean 03:00 **your** time. The
 version in this repo has no tzdata, so its 03:00 is 03:00 UTC — which for me is
 an hour that shifts twice a year.
 ### Checking it actually works
 Don't wait until 03:00 to find out. Call the endpoint by hand:
 ```bash
 # from the host, through the published port
 curl "http://localhost:8564/api/v1/cron/<your-token>"
 # or from inside the cron container, which proves DNS and the network too
 docker exec firefly_iii_cron wget -qO- "http://app:8080/api/v1/cron/<your-token>"
 ```
 A correct token returns JSON describing what ran. A wrong one returns a 404 —
 that 404 is the whole failure mode, so seeing it here is the point of the test.
 The cron container logs to stdout (`crond -f -L /dev/stdout`), so after a
 scheduled run:
 ```bash
 docker logs firefly_iii_cron
 ```
 There's also `docker exec firefly_iii_core php artisan firefly-iii:cron` if you'd
 rather drive it from the app side and skip the token entirely.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **Four containers, and each one earns its place.** `app` is PHP serving HTTP.
 `db` is MariaDB — Firefly is a double-entry ledger and wants a real relational
 database, not SQLite. `cron` exists because `app` has no scheduler (see above).
 `importer` is genuinely optional: it's a separate application with its own
 release cycle that talks to Firefly over the API like any other client. Delete
 the service if you only ever enter transactions by hand.
 **The importer must be pointed at `http://app:8080`.** Not `localhost`, not the
 public URL. The compose file carries upstream's warning at the top: other URLs
 give `500 | Server Error`. It's container-to-container traffic on the compose
 network, so it uses the service name and the *internal* port.
 **`VANITY_URL` is the other half of that.** The importer talks to `app:8080`,
 but the links it renders in your browser have to be clickable from outside — so
 that variable holds the public URL. Two URLs for one service, one for machines
 and one for humans.
 **This stack still follows upstream's layout, not this repo's conventions.**
 Worth stating plainly rather than pretending otherwise, because the differences
 are visible:
 - Data goes to `./firefly_iii_upload` and `./firefly_iii_db` beside the compose
  file, instead of `${DATA_PATH}`.
 - `restart: always` rather than `unless-stopped` — so a deliberate stop does not
  survive a reboot.
 - `.env` is the *application's* config file, so the usual "`.env` holds a few
  Compose variables" pattern doesn't apply here at all.
 Adapting it is a fine idea; just do it deliberately.
 ## Gotchas
 - **`APP_KEY` and `STATIC_CRON_TOKEN` must be exactly 32 characters.** Not a
  minimum — exactly. `openssl rand -base64 24 | cut -c1-32` gives you one.
  A wrong-length `APP_KEY` fails at boot; a wrong-length cron token fails
  silently at 03:00.
 - **The top-level `volumes:` block is dead code.** It declares
  `firefly_iii_upload` and `firefly_iii_db`, but both services use *relative
  bind mounts* (`./firefly_iii_upload`) instead. The named volumes are created
  and never written to. Harmless, but if you go looking for your database in
  `docker volume ls` you'll find an empty volume and conclude the wrong thing —
  the data is in the directory next to `compose.yaml`.
 - **MariaDB creates its bind directory as root.** Expect `./firefly_iii_db` to
  be root-owned; that's normal and it needs to stay that way.
 - **`DB_PASSWORD` (`.env`) and `MYSQL_PASSWORD` (`.db.env`) are the same secret
  in two files.** Changing one and not the other gives you an app that starts
  cleanly and then errors on every page.
 - **Changing `MYSQL_PASSWORD` after the first start does nothing.** The database
  is initialized once, from the empty data directory. After that the credentials
  live in MariaDB, and the env var is ignored — change it in the database, or
  wipe `./firefly_iii_db` and start over.
 - **`:latest` on both images.** Firefly does schema migrations between releases;
  an unattended pull across a major is not how you want to meet them. Pin a tag
  once you're settled.
 - **Back up `./firefly_iii_db`.** That's the ledger. `firefly_iii_upload` holds
  attachments and matters less, but isn't regenerable either.
 - **The importer holds a Personal Access Token, not a password.** Upstream is
  emphatic that the "command line token" is the wrong one. You can use a client
  ID instead and leave the token empty.
 ## Exposing it
 Publishes plain HTTP; set `APP_URL` and `TRUSTED_PROXIES=**` and it behaves
 behind a proxy.
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — the default choice.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — fine for this one. It's a text
  app; nothing here bumps the ~100 MB body cap unless you attach large files.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md#forward-auth--putting-an-app-with-no-sso-behind-authentik)
  — **what I do.** Firefly has no OIDC support, so it sits behind Authentik
  forward auth: Caddy checks with Authentik before the request reaches the
  container. That means two logins, Authentik then Firefly, which for bank data
  is a trade worth making — the app's own login form is never exposed to the
  internet. The exact Caddyfile is in that doc.
  Two things to keep in mind here specifically. Firefly's **API is behind the
  same wall**, so external API clients stop working (the bundled importer is
  unaffected — it talks to `app:8080` inside the compose network, never through
  the proxy). And keep a working local admin until the flow is proven; locking
  yourself out of your own ledger is an unpleasant afternoon.
 ## Links
 - Upstream docs: <https://docs.firefly-iii.org/>
 - Docker install guide: <https://docs.firefly-iii.org/how-to/firefly-iii/installation/docker/>
 - Their sample compose: <https://github.com/firefly-iii/docker/blob/main/docker-compose.yml>
 - Full `.env.example`: <https://github.com/firefly-iii/firefly-iii/blob/main/.env.example>
 - Data Importer: <https://docs.firefly-iii.org/how-to/data-importer/>
 - Images: <https://hub.docker.com/r/fireflyiii/core> · <https://hub.docker.com/r/fireflyiii/data-importer>
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
 # The Firefly III Data Importer will ask you for the Firefly III URL and a "Client ID".
 # You can generate the Client ID at http://localhost/profile (after registering)
 # The Firefly III URL is: http://app:8080
 #
 # Other URL's will give 500 | Server Error
 #
 services:
  app:
    image: fireflyiii/core:latest
    hostname: app
    container_name: firefly_iii_core
    networks:
      - firefly_iii
    restart: always
    volumes:
      - ./firefly_iii_upload:/var/www/html/storage/upload
    env_file: .env
    ports:
      - '8564:8080'
    depends_on:
      - db
  db:
    image: mariadb
    hostname: db
    container_name: firefly_iii_db
    networks:
      - firefly_iii
    restart: always
    env_file: .db.env
    volumes:
      - ./firefly_iii_db:/var/lib/mysql
  importer:
    image: fireflyiii/data-importer:latest
    hostname: importer
    restart: always
    container_name: firefly_iii_importer
    networks:
      - firefly_iii
    ports:
      - '8566:8080'
    depends_on:
      - app
    env_file: .importer.env
  cron:
    #
    # To make this work, set STATIC_CRON_TOKEN in your .env file or as an environment variable and replace REPLACEME below
    # The STATIC_CRON_TOKEN must be *exactly* 32 characters long
    #
    image: alpine
    container_name: firefly_iii_cron
    restart: always
    command: sh -c "echo \"0 3 * * * wget -qO- http://app:8080/api/v1/cron/REPLACEME\" | crontab - && crond -f -L /dev/stdout"
    networks:
      - firefly_iii
 volumes:
   firefly_iii_upload:
   firefly_iii_db:
 networks:
  firefly_iii:
    driver: bridge
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # Every value here has a default in compose.yaml, so a fresh clone runs
 # with no .env at all.
 # ─── Identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Become USER_UID / USER_GID in the container, which is how Gitea's `git`
 # user is made to match the owner of the bind-mounted data directory.
 # Wrong values mean Gitea cannot write its own data.
 #
 #   id -u ; id -g
 #
 #PUID=1000
 #PGID=1000
 # ─── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Repositories, the SQLite database and conf/app.ini. This is the whole
 # backup -- nothing in it regenerates.
 #DATA_PATH=./data
 # ─── Ports ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #PORT=3000
 # Host port for SSH clone; the container always listens on 22. Port 22 on
 # the host belongs to the host's own sshd, which is why this isn't 22.
 #
 # If you change it, also uncomment GITEA__server__SSH_PORT in compose.yaml
 # so the clone URLs Gitea advertises match -- otherwise it hands out
 # port 22 and clients land on the host's sshd instead.
 #SSH_PORT=222
 # ─── Timezone ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # There is no TZ variable here on purpose: compose.yaml mounts the host's
 # /etc/timezone and /etc/localtime read-only, so the container follows the
 # host automatically.
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
 # Gitea
 Self-hosted Git with a web UI, issues and pull requests. A few hundred MB of Go
 that starts in a second, where the alternative is a JVM and a shopping list of
 services.
 This is the stack the rest of this repo is developed against — the compose files
 you're reading live in a Gitea instance, and GitHub is the mirror.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env            # PUID/PGID must match the owner of ./gitea
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:3000`. You get Gitea's **install wizard**, not a login page —
 it writes `app.ini` from what you enter and that's the moment the instance is
 configured. Two things to settle there rather than later:
 1. **Server and Third-Party Service Settings → Base URL.** Set it to the URL
   people will actually use. Wrong here means every clone URL it hands out is
   wrong.
 2. **Create the admin account** at the bottom of the wizard. If you skip it,
   *the first user to register becomes the administrator* — which is fine on a
   LAN and not fine on anything reachable.
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 3000 | http | Web UI and the HTTP(S) clone endpoint |
 | 222 | ssh | SSH clone endpoint (container listens on 22) |
 ## Why it looks like this
 **It started as upstream's example** —
 [Install with Docker](https://docs.gitea.com/installation/install-with-docker/)
 — with four changes to bring it in line with the rest of this repo, listed at
 the end of this section. Everything else is upstream's, and what follows is what
 those choices actually mean.
 **SQLite by default.** There's no database container here, and none is needed:
 with no `GITEA__database__DB_TYPE` set, Gitea uses SQLite inside `/data`. For one
 person or a small team that is genuinely the right answer — one less container,
 one less backup, and the performance ceiling is far above what a personal
 instance reaches. Upstream documents MySQL and PostgreSQL variants using
 `GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=mysql` / `postgres`; switch if you outgrow it, and do
 it before there's data to migrate.
 **`USER_UID` / `USER_GID` exist because of the bind mount.** `./gitea:/data` is a
 host directory, so the `git` user inside the container has to match whoever owns
 it. Upstream notes that named volumes avoid the problem entirely — Docker manages
 ownership — at the cost of your data being somewhere less obvious.
 **SSH is on 222, not 22**, because 22 on the host belongs to the host's own sshd.
 This is the source of the most common Gitea confusion: see the gotchas.
 **Environment variables map to `app.ini` sections** with the pattern
 `GITEA__section__KEY`. So `GITEA__server__ROOT_URL` sets `ROOT_URL` under
 `[server]`. Useful to know, because the wizard only exposes a fraction of what
 Gitea can be told.
 ### What was changed from upstream's example
 Four things, all for the same reason — this file is published, and a fresh clone
 has to work:
 - **`${PUID:-1000}` / `${PGID:-1000}` instead of bare `${PUID}`.** Compose
  interpolates an unset variable to an *empty string* and starts the container
  anyway, so upstream's version hands Gitea `USER_UID=` on any clone without a
  `.env`. Defaults are the convention here for exactly this reason.
 - **`restart: unless-stopped` instead of `always`**, so a deliberate stop
  survives a reboot.
 - **`${DATA_PATH:-./data}` instead of `./gitea`**, which also stops the data
  landing at the slightly comic `gitea/gitea/`.
 - **Pinned to `1.27.3` instead of `:latest`**, because Gitea runs schema
  migrations between releases.
 Two settings are also present but commented out —
 `GITEA__server__SSH_PORT` and `GITEA__server__ROOT_URL` — because both are
 things you will need the moment you publish this beyond localhost. See the
 gotchas.
 ## Gotchas
 - **SSH clone URLs advertise the wrong port by default.** Gitea knows it listens
  on 22 *inside* the container; it has no idea you published it on 222. So it
  offers `git@host:user/repo.git`, which sends the client to port 22 — the host's
  sshd — and the failure looks like a key problem rather than a port problem.
  Uncomment `GITEA__server__SSH_PORT` in `compose.yaml` (it tracks `SSH_PORT`,
  so the two can't drift), or set the SSH port in the wizard.
 - **Behind a reverse proxy, `ROOT_URL` is the setting that matters.** Get it
  wrong and the UI works fine while every clone URL, webhook and OAuth redirect
  points somewhere else. See [reverse proxy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md), which
  already lists Gitea as a service needing this.
 - **The install wizard runs once.** After it writes `app.ini`, that file wins —
  changing an environment variable afterwards does *not* change a setting the
  wizard already recorded. Edit `gitea/gitea/conf/app.ini` (or delete it and
  reinstall) if you need to change course.
 - **First registered user becomes admin** if you didn't create an admin in the
  wizard. Disable registration once your accounts exist:
  `GITEA__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION=true`.
 - **Back up `./gitea`.** It holds every repository, the SQLite database, and
  `conf/app.ini`. There is nothing else to back up, and nothing in it
  regenerates.
 - **Mirror pushes need credentials that outlive your session.** If you push from
  here to GitHub, that's an access token or deploy key stored in Gitea, not your
  laptop's agent.
 ## Exposing it
 Publishes plain HTTP; TLS belongs at the proxy.
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — **needs `ROOT_URL`**,
  see above. HTTP clone and the web UI both go through it.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — works for the web UI and HTTP
  clone, but **SSH clone won't pass** and the ~100 MB body cap will meet you at
  the first large push. Fine for browsing, awkward as your only route.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — Gitea speaks OIDC
  natively, so use that rather than forward auth, which would break `git` over
  HTTP as surely as it breaks any other non-browser client.
 ## Links
 - Install with Docker: <https://docs.gitea.com/installation/install-with-docker/>
 - Configuration cheat sheet: <https://docs.gitea.com/administration/config-cheat-sheet>
 - Image: <https://hub.docker.com/r/gitea/gitea>
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
 networks:
  gitea:
    external: false
 services:
  server:
    # Pinned. Gitea runs schema migrations between releases, so an unattended
    # pull picking up a new minor is not something to meet by surprise.
    image: docker.gitea.com/gitea:1.27.3
    container_name: gitea
    restart: unless-stopped
    networks:
      - gitea
    environment:
      # Gitea's `git` user is made to match the owner of the bind-mounted data
      # directory. Defaults so a fresh clone runs with no .env at all -- bare
      # ${PUID} would interpolate to an empty string and start anyway.
      - USER_UID=${PUID:-1000}
      - USER_GID=${PGID:-1000}
      # Gitea knows it listens on 22 inside the container and has no idea it is
      # published on 222, so the SSH clone URLs it hands out send clients to the
      # host's own sshd. Uncomment to match the published port below.
      #- GITEA__server__SSH_PORT=${SSH_PORT:-222}
      # Set this once you're behind a proxy, or every clone URL, webhook and
      # OAuth redirect points at the wrong host.
      #- GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=https://git.example.com/
    volumes:
      # Every repository, the SQLite database and conf/app.ini. Back this up --
      # nothing in it regenerates.
      - ${DATA_PATH:-./data}:/data
      # Timezone comes from the host rather than a TZ variable.
      - /etc/timezone:/etc/timezone:ro
      - /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro
    ports:
      - "${PORT:-3000}:3000"
      # 22 on the host belongs to the host's own sshd, hence 222.
      - "${SSH_PORT:-222}:22"
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 #
 # Only TEMPDISK is required -- everything else has a default in
 # compose.yaml. (compose.personal.yaml has no defaults at all: it uses
 # bare ${PUID} etc., which Compose turns into empty strings rather than
 # failing, so with that file set all four.)
 # ─── Identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Owner of the downloads directory and the two config directories.
 #   id -u ; id -g
 #PUID=1000
 #PGID=1000
 #TZ=Europe/Paris
 # ─── Where downloads land ───────────────────────────────────────────
 # The parent of downloads/torrents and downloads/pyload. Point this at
 # the disk with room on it -- this is the one path that cannot have a
 # sensible default.
 TEMPDISK=/mnt/tank
 # ─── Proxy authentication ───────────────────────────────────────────
 # Both proxies are UNAUTHENTICATED unless these are set -- anyone who can
 # reach ports 9980/9998 can route traffic through your VPN account. Set
 # both (gluetun needs user and password together) and authentication turns
 # on for the HTTP and SOCKS5 proxies at once.
 #PROXY_USER=
 #PROXY_PASSWORD=
 # ─── Ports ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #QBT_PORT=9880
 #PYLOAD_PORT=8880
 #SOCKS_PORT=9980
 #HTTPPROXY_PORT=9998
 # ─── NOT in this file ───────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Your WireGuard credentials do NOT belong here. They live in wg0.conf
 # next to compose.yaml, which is git-ignored (see the README). Do not
 # move that file into init/ and do not paste its keys into .env.
@@ -1,223 +0,0 @@
 # gluetun + qBittorrent + pyload-ng
 A VPN container with two download clients living inside its network stack. The
 point is the **kill switch**: qBittorrent and pyload-ng have no network of their
 own, so if the tunnel drops they lose connectivity entirely rather than falling
 back to your real address.
 Also exposes gluetun's HTTP and SOCKS5 proxies, so other machines and browser
 extensions (SwitchyOmega and friends) can route through the same tunnel without
 running a VPN client themselves.
 Configured for **TorGuard WireGuard** via gluetun's `custom` provider.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env                  # TEMPDISK is the one you must set
 # Get a WireGuard config from TorGuard's config generator, save it as
 # wg0.conf NEXT TO THIS FILE. It is git-ignored. Do not put it in init/.
 cp ~/Downloads/torguard-wg.conf ./wg0.conf
 docker compose up -d
 docker compose logs -f gluetun     # watch for the public IP line
 ```
 Verify the tunnel is actually carrying traffic before you seed anything:
 ```bash
 docker compose exec gluetun wget -qO- https://ipinfo.io/ip   # should be TorGuard's
 curl -x http://localhost:9998 https://ipinfo.io/ip           # same, via the HTTP proxy
 ```
 ## Ports
 Every port is published on the **gluetun** service, because the other two
 containers have no network namespace of their own.
 | Host | Container | Purpose |
 |------|-----------|---------|
 | 9880 | 9880 | qBittorrent web UI |
 | 8880 | 8000 | pyload-ng web UI |
 | 9980 | 1080 | SOCKS5 proxy |
 | 9998 | 8888 | HTTP proxy |
 In `compose.personal.yaml` two of these differ: pyload is published `8880:8880`
 against a container that listens on 8000, and the SOCKS5 server isn't running at
 all. See the gotchas.
 ## Two compose files
 **[`compose.yaml`](compose.yaml)** is the maintained one and what
 `docker compose up` uses.
 **[`compose.personal.yaml`](compose.personal.yaml)** is the older variant still
 running on my own box. It works and its HTTP proxy is in daily use, so it's kept
 as-is rather than tidied — but it has the quirks listed under gotchas below.
 Compose won't load it unless you name it:
 ```bash
 docker compose -f compose.personal.yaml up -d
 ```
 What the maintained file changes:
 | Change | Why |
 |--------|-----|
 | `SOCKS5_ENABLED` / `SOCKS5_LISTENING_ADDRESS` | `SOCKSPROXY*` are not gluetun variables; the SOCKS5 server never starts |
 | `HTTPPROXY_LISTENING_ADDRESS` | `HTTPPROXY_PORT` works but logs a deprecation warning |
 | `8880:8000` | pyload-ng listens on 8000; its port isn't settable by env var |
 | `HTTPPROXY_USER` / `SOCKS5_USER` + passwords | opt-in proxy authentication, off unless set in `.env` |
 | `qmcgaw/gluetun:v3.41.3` | pinned; this container holds the tunnel |
 | `${PUID:-1000}`, `${TEMPDISK:?…}` | defaults where sensible, loud failure where a value can't be guessed |
 | `condition: service_healthy` | gluetun ships a healthcheck; wait for the tunnel instead of racing it |
 | `lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent` | matches pyload-ng's registry; same image |
 Same design, same ports, same volumes.
 ## Other VPN providers
 Nothing here is TorGuard-specific except `wg0.conf`. gluetun natively supports
 around twenty providers, and for most of them you delete the file mount and set
 two or three variables instead:
 ```yaml
      - VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER=mullvad
      - VPN_TYPE=wireguard
      - WIREGUARD_PRIVATE_KEY=${WIREGUARD_PRIVATE_KEY}
      - WIREGUARD_ADDRESSES=${WIREGUARD_ADDRESSES}
      - SERVER_CITIES=Amsterdam
 ```
 **Native WireGuard** — the easy path: AirVPN, FastestVPN, IVPN, Mullvad,
 NordVPN, ProtonVPN, Surfshark, Windscribe.
 **Native OpenVPN** — every supported provider, usually just `OPENVPN_USER` and
 `OPENVPN_PASSWORD`: the list above plus Cyberghost, ExpressVPN, Giganews,
 HideMyAss, IPVanish, Privado, Private Internet Access, PrivateVPN, PureVPN,
 SlickVPN, TorGuard, VPNSecure, VPN Unlimited, VyprVPN.
 **WireGuard via the custom provider** — Cyberghost, Private Internet Access,
 PrivateVPN, PureVPN, TorGuard, VPN Unlimited and VyprVPN have no native
 WireGuard support in gluetun, so they take the `wg0.conf` route this stack uses.
 That last line is why this stack looks the way it does: **TorGuard *is* a
 built-in provider (`VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER=torguard`), but only for OpenVPN.**
 Wanting TorGuard *and* WireGuard is precisely the case gluetun's own
 documentation sends to the custom provider. It isn't a workaround — it's the
 documented path.
 Switching provider changes nothing else: the kill switch, the shared network
 namespace and both proxies work the same way regardless of who terminates the
 tunnel. Check your provider's page in
 [the gluetun wiki](https://github.com/qdm12/gluetun-wiki) for its exact
 variables.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **`network_mode: "service:gluetun"` is the whole design.** qBittorrent and
 pyload-ng don't get their own network stack — they share gluetun's. That's what
 makes the kill switch absolute: there is no route out except the tunnel, so a
 misconfiguration fails closed rather than leaking. The cost is that those
 containers **cannot declare their own `ports:`**; Docker refuses it. Every port
 they need is published on gluetun instead, which is why the list above looks
 like it belongs to the wrong service.
 **gluetun's firewall is on by default.** Confirmed in its startup summary
 (`Firewall settings: Enabled: yes`) — you don't have to configure a kill switch,
 you have to avoid breaking the one that's already there.
 **`VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER=custom` plus a mounted `wg0.conf`.** TorGuard isn't one
 of gluetun's built-in providers, so rather than translating their config into
 `WIREGUARD_PRIVATE_KEY` / `VPN_ENDPOINT_IP` environment variables, the whole
 config file is mounted at `/gluetun/wireguard/wg0.conf` and gluetun parses it.
 Verified working: gluetun reads the endpoint, interface address and keys
 straight out of that file. It also keeps the private key out of `docker inspect`
 and out of your shell history, which the environment-variable approach does not.
 **`:latest` on all three images**, which is upstream's habit rather than a
 decision. Worth pinning gluetun in particular — it's the one holding the tunnel.
 ## Security: the proxies are unauthenticated by default
 Both proxies ship with no credentials, so **anyone who can reach ports 9998 or
 9980 can route traffic through your VPN account**. On a trusted LAN that may be
 exactly what you want — it's what makes them useful from a browser extension on
 another machine. It is not something to expose beyond that, and not something to
 forget you did.
 `compose.yaml` has the variables wired already; set both in `.env` and
 authentication switches on for both proxies at once:
 ```bash
 PROXY_USER=someone
 PROXY_PASSWORD=a-long-random-string
 ```
 Leave them unset and behaviour is unchanged. gluetun needs the user *and*
 password together — one alone does nothing.
 Never port-forward these from your router. An open proxy on the public internet
 is found within hours, and everything that follows is attributed to your VPN
 account.
 ## Gotchas
 - **`SOCKSPROXY` is not a gluetun variable.** Neither is `SOCKSPROXY_PORT`.
  gluetun ignores both silently — no warning — so the SOCKS5 server never
  starts and its published port maps to nothing. Its own settings summary is
  the proof: `SOCKS5 proxy server settings: Enabled: no`. The real names are
  `SOCKS5_ENABLED=on` and `SOCKS5_LISTENING_ADDRESS=:1080`. Fixed in
  `compose.yaml`; still present in `compose.personal.yaml`, whose HTTP proxy
  works fine and whose SOCKS port does not.
 - **`HTTPPROXY_PORT` is deprecated but does work.** gluetun logs `WARN You are
  using the old environment variable HTTPPROXY_PORT, please consider changing
  it to HTTPPROXY_LISTENING_ADDRESS`, then brings the proxy up on 8888 anyway.
 - **pyload-ng listens on 8000.** The LinuxServer image's web UI port is 8000
  and is *not* settable by environment variable — only inside pyload's own
  config in `./pyloadconfig`. So a `8880:8880` mapping reaches nothing unless
  you already changed it there; `compose.yaml` publishes `8880:8000` instead.
  (Click'n'Load on 9666 isn't published at all.)
 - **`wg0.conf` must exist before the first `up`.** It's a bind mount of a
  *file*; if the path is missing, Docker creates a **directory** there, gluetun
  finds no config, and the error doesn't mention the mount. Same failure mode as
  [overleaf's init script](../overleaf/README.md#running-it-on-openmediavault).
 - **Never put `wg0.conf` in `init/`.** This repo's `.gitignore` un-ignores
  `*/init/**` so that runtime config fragments get committed — which for a
  WireGuard config means publishing your private key. `wg*.conf` and `*.ovpn`
  are now explicitly ignored everywhere as a guard, but the habit is the real
  protection.
 - **Restarting gluetun cuts the other two off.** They share its namespace, so
  when it goes away their network does too, and `depends_on` doesn't bring them
  back. Restart the whole stack, not one service.
 - **`TORRENTING_PORT=6881` is not published**, so incoming peer connections
  don't arrive and you're limited to outgoing ones. Fixing that properly needs
  port forwarding from TorGuard, then publishing the matching port on gluetun.
 - **In `compose.personal.yaml` the variables have no defaults.** `${PUID}`,
  `${PGID}`, `${TZ}` and `${TEMPDISK}` are bare, so Compose interpolates empty
  strings and starts the containers anyway. `compose.yaml` uses
  `${PUID:-1000}` and `${TEMPDISK:?…}`, which aborts with a readable message
  instead.
 - **Check for leaks after any change**, not just at setup. `docker compose exec
  gluetun wget -qO- https://ipinfo.io/ip` is the ten-second version.
 ## Exposing it
 **Don't.** This stack has no business being reachable from the internet: two
 admin UIs with weak-by-default auth and two unauthenticated open proxies.
 If you need the UIs remotely, reach them over your own VPN or a
 [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) with
 [Authentik forward auth](../docs/authentik-sso.md#forward-auth--putting-an-app-with-no-sso-behind-authentik)
 in front — and leave the proxy ports off it entirely.
 ## Links
 - gluetun (now at the passteque org): <https://github.com/passteque/gluetun>
 - gluetun wiki: <https://github.com/qdm12/gluetun-wiki>
 - TorGuard WireGuard + gluetun guide:
  <https://www.torguard.net/support/articles/TorGuard-Software-Features/torguard-wireguard-gluetun-docker-setup.php>
 - qBittorrent image: <https://docs.linuxserver.io/images/docker-qbittorrent/>
 - pyload-ng image: <https://docs.linuxserver.io/images/docker-pyload-ng/>
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
 services:
  gluetun:
    image: qmcgaw/gluetun
    container_name: gluetun
    cap_add:
      - NET_ADMIN
    devices:
      - /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun
    environment:
      - VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER=custom
      - VPN_TYPE=wireguard
      # Enable SOCKS5 proxy
      - SOCKSPROXY=on
      - SOCKSPROXY_PORT=1080
      # Optional HTTP proxy
      - HTTPPROXY=on
      - HTTPPROXY_PORT=8888
    ports:
      - "9880:9880/tcp" # Qbittorrent Web UI
      - "8880:8880/tcp" # PyLoad Web-UI
      - "9980:1080/tcp" # Socks Proxy
      - "9998:8888/tcp" # HTTP Proxy
    volumes:
      - /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro
      - ./wg0.conf:/gluetun/wireguard/wg0.conf
    restart: unless-stopped
  qbittorrent:
    image: linuxserver/qbittorrent:latest
    container_name: qbittorrent
    environment:
      - PUID=${PUID}
      - PGID=${PGID}
      - TZ=${TZ}
      - WEBUI_PORT=9880
      - TORRENTING_PORT=6881
    volumes:
      - ./config:/config
      - '${TEMPDISK}/downloads/torrents:/downloads'
    network_mode: "service:gluetun"
    depends_on:
      - gluetun
    restart: unless-stopped
  pyload-ng:
    image: lscr.io/linuxserver/pyload-ng:latest
    container_name: pyload-ng
    environment:
      - PUID=${PUID}
      - PGID=${PGID}
      - TZ=${TZ}
    volumes:
      - ./pyloadconfig:/config
      - ${TEMPDISK}/downloads/pyload:/downloads
    network_mode: "service:gluetun"
    depends_on:
      - gluetun
    restart: unless-stopped
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
 # The maintained version of this stack -- this is what `docker compose up`
 # uses. See compose.personal.yaml for the older variant still running on
 # my own box, and the README for what differs between them.
 services:
  gluetun:
    # Pinned. This container holds the tunnel; an unattended pull breaking it
    # means the download clients lose all connectivity (by design).
    image: qmcgaw/gluetun:v3.41.3
    container_name: gluetun
    cap_add:
      - NET_ADMIN
    devices:
      - /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun
    environment:
      - VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER=custom
      - VPN_TYPE=wireguard
      # SOCKS5 proxy. The names matter: SOCKSPROXY / SOCKSPROXY_PORT are NOT
      # gluetun variables -- it ignores them silently and the proxy never
      # starts. Verified against gluetun's own settings summary.
      - SOCKS5_ENABLED=on
      - SOCKS5_LISTENING_ADDRESS=:1080
      # HTTP proxy. HTTPPROXY_PORT still works but logs a deprecation warning;
      # LISTENING_ADDRESS is the current name.
      - HTTPPROXY=on
      - HTTPPROXY_LISTENING_ADDRESS=:8888
      # Proxy authentication. Empty means NO authentication -- anyone who can
      # reach the published ports can use the VPN. Set both vars in .env to
      # turn it on; leaving them unset keeps the current behaviour.
      - HTTPPROXY_USER=${PROXY_USER:-}
      - HTTPPROXY_PASSWORD=${PROXY_PASSWORD:-}
      - SOCKS5_USER=${PROXY_USER:-}
      - SOCKS5_PASSWORD=${PROXY_PASSWORD:-}
    ports:
      - "${QBT_PORT:-9880}:9880/tcp"      # qBittorrent Web UI
      # pyload-ng listens on 8000 inside the container and the port is not
      # settable by environment variable -- only in pyload's own config.
      - "${PYLOAD_PORT:-8880}:8000/tcp"   # pyLoad Web UI
      - "${SOCKS_PORT:-9980}:1080/tcp"    # SOCKS5 proxy
      - "${HTTPPROXY_PORT:-9998}:8888/tcp" # HTTP proxy
      # Incoming BitTorrent peers. Needs a forwarded port from TorGuard, and
      # the number here must match TORRENTING_PORT below.
      #- "6881:6881/tcp"
      #- "6881:6881/udp"
    volumes:
      - /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro
      # Bind mount of a FILE. It must exist before the first `up` or Docker
      # creates a directory here and gluetun finds no config. Git-ignored.
      - ./wg0.conf:/gluetun/wireguard/wg0.conf:ro
    restart: unless-stopped
  qbittorrent:
    image: lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:latest
    container_name: qbittorrent
    environment:
      - PUID=${PUID:-1000}
      - PGID=${PGID:-1000}
      - TZ=${TZ:-Etc/UTC}
      - WEBUI_PORT=9880
      - TORRENTING_PORT=6881
    volumes:
      - ${CONFIG_PATH:-./config}:/config
      - "${TEMPDISK:?set TEMPDISK in .env to the disk your downloads live on}/downloads/torrents:/downloads"
    # No network of its own: everything goes through the tunnel, and there is
    # no route out if the tunnel drops. This is also why it cannot declare
    # its own `ports:` -- they live on gluetun above.
    network_mode: "service:gluetun"
    depends_on:
      gluetun:
        # gluetun ships a healthcheck; wait for the tunnel rather than racing it.
        condition: service_healthy
    restart: unless-stopped
  pyload-ng:
    image: lscr.io/linuxserver/pyload-ng:latest
    container_name: pyload-ng
    environment:
      - PUID=${PUID:-1000}
      - PGID=${PGID:-1000}
      - TZ=${TZ:-Etc/UTC}
    volumes:
      - ${PYLOAD_CONFIG_PATH:-./pyloadconfig}:/config
      - ${TEMPDISK}/downloads/pyload:/downloads
    network_mode: "service:gluetun"
    depends_on:
      gluetun:
        condition: service_healthy
    restart: unless-stopped
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 #
 # compose.yaml currently writes these as bare ${PUID} / ${PGID} / ${TZ},
 # with no defaults, so a clone without a .env starts the container with
 # empty values instead of failing. Set all three -- or add `:-` defaults
 # to compose.yaml, which is what the rest of this repo does.
 # ─── Identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Must own the data directory, or Heimdall can't write its database.
 #   id -u ; id -g
 PUID=1000
 PGID=1000
 TZ=Europe/Paris
 # ─── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Mounted at /config. Holds the SQLite database, uploaded icons, the
 # nginx config -- and the API keys of every "enhanced" app you add.
 # Back it up; never commit it.
 #DATA_PATH=./data
 # ─── Ports ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #PORT=4080
 #HTTPS_PORT=4043
 # ─── Reaching your own LAN ──────────────────────────────────────────
 # NOT set in compose.yaml, and the one you will most likely need.
 # Heimdall blocks enhanced-app lookups to private/reserved IPs by
 # default -- which is every service in your house. See the README.
 #ALLOW_INTERNAL_REQUESTS=true
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
 # Heimdall
 A start page for everything else in this repo. Tiles that link to your services,
 and for some of them an "enhanced" tile that polls the app's API and shows
 something useful on the face of it — disk free, active downloads, unread count.
 Actively maintained, despite its age: v2.8.3 landed in September 2026.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env            # PUID/PGID/TZ have no defaults in compose.yaml
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:4080`. There is no login and no setup wizard — you get an
 empty dashboard, and everything is configured by clicking around. Read the
 security note below before you put anything on it.
 ## Ports
 | Host | Container | Purpose |
 |------|-----------|---------|
 | 4080 | 80 | Web UI |
 | 4043 | 443 | Heimdall's own HTTPS listener — see gotchas |
 ## Why it looks like this
 **The LinuxServer image**, same reasoning as [jellyfin](../jellyfin/README.md):
 `PUID`/`PGID`/`TZ`, `/config`, s6, one rebuild cadence. For a service this small
 the win is that it behaves like everything else on the box.
 **`./data` mounted at `/config`.** The names disagree because the repo's
 convention is `data/` on the host and the image's convention is `/config` in the
 container. Whatever it's called, it is the entire service: the SQLite database,
 uploaded icons, the nginx config, and the API keys of every enhanced tile.
 **Nothing else.** No database container, no cache, no environment variables
 beyond the LinuxServer three. This is one of the genuinely simple stacks — which
 is why the interesting content below is about what Heimdall *doesn't* tell you.
 ## Gotchas
 - **Heimdall blocks requests to your own LAN by default.** This is the one that
  wastes an afternoon. Enhanced tiles — the ones that show live data — make a
  server-side request to the app's API, and the image ships
  `ALLOW_INTERNAL_REQUESTS=false`, which refuses lookups to private or reserved
  IP addresses. Every service in your house is on a private address, so every
  enhanced tile fails, and the tile just sits there looking broken. Add
  `ALLOW_INTERNAL_REQUESTS=true` to the environment block. It is not in
  `compose.yaml` today.
 - **There is no authentication out of the box.** Anyone who reaches port 4080
  gets a map of your entire infrastructure, with working links. Heimdall can
  password-protect itself, or you can put basic auth in front via the image's
  nginx:
  ```bash
  docker exec -it heimdall htpasswd -c /config/nginx/.htpasswd <username>
  ```
  then uncomment the basic auth lines in `/config/nginx/site-confs/default.conf`
  and restart. Better still, put [Authentik forward
  auth](../docs/authentik-sso.md#forward-auth--putting-an-app-with-no-sso-behind-authentik)
  in front — a dashboard is the textbook case for it, since it has no accounts
  worth integrating and every client is a browser.
 - **Enhanced tiles store API keys in the data directory.** That's a Sonarr key,
  a Nextcloud token, whatever you connected. `data/` is git-ignored by this
  repo's deny-by-default rule — verified — but it means the directory is a
  credential store, not just cosmetics. Back it up accordingly, and don't paste
  it into a gist when asking for help.
 - **Port 4043 is Heimdall's own TLS**, with a self-signed certificate. In this
  repo TLS terminates at the proxy, so the mapping is redundant — drop the line
  unless you're reaching it directly and are willing to click through the
  warning.
 - **`${PUID}`, `${PGID}` and `${TZ}` are bare.** No `:-1000` defaults, so a
  clone with no `.env` gets empty strings and starts anyway — confirmed:
  Compose emits `The "PUID" variable is not set. Defaulting to a blank string.`
  and carries on. The rest of this repo writes `${PUID:-1000}`.
 - **`:latest`.** Heimdall ships real releases (`2.8.3`, `v2.8.3-ls363`); pin one
  if you'd rather not be surprised.
 - **Back up `data/`.** Rebuilding a dashboard by hand is an hour you won't enjoy,
  and the icons you uploaded aren't anywhere else.
 ## Exposing it
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — the normal route; use
  port 4080 and ignore 4043.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — **strongly
  recommended if this leaves the LAN.** Forward auth is the right fit: no
  accounts to map, browser-only clients, and it stops the dashboard being a
  directory of your network for anyone who finds it.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — fine, it's a small HTML page.
 ## Links
 - Upstream: <https://github.com/linuxserver/Heimdall>
 - Image: <https://docs.linuxserver.io/images/docker-heimdall/>
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
 services:
  heimdall:
    image: lscr.io/linuxserver/heimdall:latest
    container_name: heimdall
    environment:
      - PUID=${PUID}
      - PGID=${PGID}
      - TZ=${TZ}
    volumes:
      - ./data:/config
    ports:
      - 4080:80
      - 4043:443
    restart: unless-stopped
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # ─── What gets served ───────────────────────────────────────────────
 # The stack serves ${TEMPDISK}/Temp as the web root -- the "/Temp"
 # suffix is in compose.yaml, so point this at the parent.
 #
 # Written bare as ${TEMPDISK} in compose.yaml, with no default: unset, it
 # interpolates to an empty string and nginx ends up serving /Temp from the
 # host root. Set it.
 TEMPDISK=/mnt/tank
 # ─── Identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Present for consistency with the other stacks, but NOTE: this is the
 # official nginx image, not LinuxServer. It has no PUID/PGID handling
 # anywhere in its entrypoint -- these are read by nobody. Its workers run
 # as uid 101 (`nginx`) regardless, and only need read access.
 PUID=1000
 PGID=1000
 # TZ affects log timestamps only.
 TZ=Europe/Paris
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
 # httpserver
 A directory of files over plain HTTP, and nothing else. No accounts, no
 database, no JavaScript — nginx with `autoindex on` pointed at a scratch
 directory. Read-only: it is for handing files out, not taking them in.
 The point is **reach**, not features. This is the share that works from a
 Windows 98 machine, a games console browser, a printer's built-in fetcher, or
 `wget` on a router. [copyparty](../copyparty/) and [filebrowser](../filebrowser/)
 are nicer for humans on modern machines; neither will talk to a client from 1999.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env            # TEMPDISK -- the parent of the Temp/ you want served
 mkdir -p "$TEMPDISK/Temp"
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:8083`.
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 8083 | http | Directory listing and downloads |
 No HTTPS, deliberately. See below.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **Plain HTTP is the feature, not an oversight.** Windows 98 cannot do TLS 1.2,
 SNI, or any cipher suite a modern server will negotiate. The moment this goes
 behind an HTTPS-terminating proxy it stops working for exactly the clients it
 exists for. Verified: an `HTTP/1.0` request with **no `Host:` header** — which
 is what ancient clients send — returns `200 OK`, because the single server block
 is the default server.
 **The generated listing is deliberately primitive.** nginx's `autoindex` emits
 `<html><head><title>` then `<h1>`, `<hr>`, `<pre>` and `<a href>`. No CSS, no
 JavaScript, not even a table. That renders in IE5, Netscape 4, Lynx, and
 everything since. Responses carry `Content-Length`, `Last-Modified` and
 `Accept-Ranges: bytes`, so resume works — which matters more on a flaky old
 machine than a modern one.
 **`include mime.types` is there despite the minimalism**, because it makes weak
 clients behave *better* and costs nothing. Mounting a config over
 `/etc/nginx/nginx.conf` replaces the whole file, including nginx's default
 `types` block, leaving only a tiny built-in table. Measured, before and after:
 | File | Without the include | With it |
 |------|--------------------|---------|
 | `photo.jpg` | `image/jpeg` | `image/jpeg` |
 | `page.html` | `text/html` | `text/html` |
 | `photo.png` | **`text/plain`** | `image/png` |
 | `archive.zip` | **`text/plain`** | `application/zip` |
 | `setup.exe` | **`text/plain`** | `application/octet-stream` |
 | `manual.pdf` | **`text/plain`** | `application/pdf` |
 | `song.mp3` | **`text/plain`** | `audio/mpeg` |
 Only html, gif and jpeg survive without it. A modern browser usually shrugs and
 downloads anyway; **IE5 on Windows 98 tries to *display* a `text/plain`
 response**, so a 700 MB zip becomes a screen of garbage instead of a Save
 dialog. The directive is parsed once at startup — no per-request cost, and the
 file already ships in the image.
 **No upload path.** nginx can accept WebDAV `PUT`, and an earlier version of
 this config did — but `autoindex` has no upload form, so a browser can never use
 it. Writes would only work from a DAV client: `curl -T`, or Windows Explorer's
 *Map network drive*. A real upload button needs a CGI or an app behind nginx,
 which is the complexity this stack exists to avoid. Use
 [copyparty](../copyparty/) or [filebrowser](../filebrowser/) when you need
 people to send files *to* you.
 **The config lives in `init/`** because this repo's `.gitignore` ignores
 everything inside a service directory except a short list, and `init/**` is on
 it. A config in any other subdirectory is silently *not committed*, and then the
 bind mount has nothing to mount — Docker creates a **directory** at that path and
 nginx won't start. Same failure mode as
 [overleaf's init script](../overleaf/README.md#running-it-on-openmediavault).
 ## Gotchas
 - **`PUID` and `PGID` do nothing.** This is the official nginx image, not
  LinuxServer; there is no PUID/PGID handling anywhere in its entrypoint. They
  are accepted and read by nobody — the same trap documented in
  [audiobookshelf](../audiobookshelf/README.md). `TZ` affects log timestamps at
  most. It costs nothing here because the share is read-only: the workers run as
  uid 101 and only ever need read access.
 - **`${TEMPDISK}` has no default.** Unset, Compose interpolates an empty string
  and nginx serves `/Temp` from the host root rather than failing. The repo's
  `${VAR:?message}` pattern exists for exactly this.
 - **Keep filenames ASCII for old clients.** `autoindex` emits filenames as raw
  bytes; Windows 98 is CP1252, so accented names mangle.
 - **`:latest` is unpinned.** If server weight matters, `nginx:alpine-slim` is
  **8 MB** compressed against **63 MB** for `nginx:latest`, with identical
  behaviour for static serving.
 - **Anyone who reaches the port sees everything.** `autoindex` publishes a
  browsable listing of the whole share with no authentication. Nothing is
  writable, so the risk is disclosure rather than tampering — but it is the
  whole directory, and that is the intended trade for a temporary share on a
  trusted network.
 ## Exposing it
 **Think twice.** If you put this behind a proxy for remote access, you lose the
 old clients that justify it existing.
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — fine for modern
  clients; it will terminate TLS and break Windows 98.
 - [Authentik forward auth](../docs/authentik-sso.md#forward-auth--putting-an-app-with-no-sso-behind-authentik)
  — the way to make it safe remotely, but it needs a browser that can complete
  the login, which rules out the same ancient clients.
 Running two hostnames — one bare HTTP on the LAN, one proxied for outside — is
 the honest way to have both.
 ## Links
 - nginx `autoindex`: <https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_autoindex_module.html>
 - Image: <https://hub.docker.com/_/nginx>
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
 services:
  nginx:
    image: nginx:latest
    container_name: nginx-webserver
    environment:
      - PUID=${PUID}
      - PGID=${PGID}
      - TZ=${TZ}
    volumes:
      - ./init/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
      - ${TEMPDISK}/Temp:/usr/share/nginx/html
    ports:
      - 8083:80
    restart: unless-stopped
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
 events {}
 http {
    # Without these every file except .html/.gif/.jpg is served as text/plain,
    # from nginx's tiny built-in table. Old browsers then try to *display* a
    # .zip or .exe instead of offering to save it. Parsed once at startup --
    # no per-request cost, and mime.types already ships in the image.
    include       /etc/nginx/mime.types;
    default_type  application/octet-stream;
    server {
        listen 80;
        server_name localhost;
        location / {
            autoindex on;
            root /usr/share/nginx/html;
        }
    }
 }
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 #
 # Immich is the one stack here where .env is NOT optional: compose.yaml
 # has `env_file: .env` on two services, so Compose refuses to start
 # without the file existing. It is also the application's own config, not
 # just a few variables Compose interpolates.
 #
 # This mirrors upstream's example.env for the pinned release. When you
 # update compose.yaml, re-fetch this too:
 #   curl -fLO https://github.com/immich-app/immich/releases/latest/download/example.env
 # ─── Storage ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Your photos and videos. Mounted at /data inside the container -- do not
 # change the container side, only this. This is the directory to back up.
 UPLOAD_LOCATION=./library
 # The Postgres data directory. Network shares (NFS/SMB) are NOT supported
 # here and will corrupt the database; it must be local storage.
 DB_DATA_LOCATION=./postgres
 # ─── Version ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Pin the MAJOR. Immich ships breaking changes between majors and the
 # compose file changes with them, so leaving this unset (which resolves
 # to `release`) means an unattended `docker compose pull` can jump a
 # major and leave your compose file behind. See the README.
 IMMICH_VERSION=v3
 # ─── Database ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Change this. Letters and digits only -- no special characters or
 # spaces, they break the connection string.
 #   openssl rand -base64 24 | tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9' | head -c 32
 DB_PASSWORD=
 # ─── Optional ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Uncomment and set to a tz identifier if the server clock isn't right.
 #TZ=Europe/Paris
 # ─── Leave these alone ──────────────────────────────────────────────
 DB_USERNAME=postgres
 DB_DATABASE_NAME=immich
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
 # Immich
 Self-hosted photo and video library. Phone backup that runs on your own disk,
 with the parts that make Google Photos worth using — face and object search,
 places, memories, shared albums — done locally by a machine-learning container.
 The heaviest stack in this repo: four containers, a Postgres with vector
 extensions, and a model cache. Budget a few GB of RAM and expect the first
 import to work the CPU hard.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env            # UPLOAD_LOCATION, DB_DATA_LOCATION, DB_PASSWORD
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:2283` and register. **The first account created is the
 admin** — there is no separate bootstrap step, so do this before the port is
 reachable by anyone else.
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 2283 | http | Web UI, mobile app API, everything |
 Postgres and Valkey are reachable only on the stack's internal network.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **This file is upstream's, verbatim, and should stay that way.** Immich ships a
 `docker-compose.yml` with each release, pins two of its images *by digest*, and
 changes the file between versions — the mount path, the Postgres extension
 build, added `shm_size`. Local edits turn every update into a three-way merge.
 The repo convention of `${VAR:-default}` is deliberately **not** applied here for
 the same reason: keeping it byte-identical to upstream means you can re-fetch and
 `diff` to see exactly what a release changed.
 ```bash
 curl -fLo /tmp/immich-new.yml \
  https://github.com/immich-app/immich/releases/latest/download/docker-compose.yml
 diff -u compose.yaml /tmp/immich-new.yml
 ```
 Pinned at **v3.2.2** (released 2026-09-15).
 **Four containers.** `immich-server` is the API and web UI. `immich-machine-learning`
 runs the CLIP and face-detection models — it is separate because it is the part
 you might want on a GPU, and because its model cache is a named volume rather
 than something you back up. `database` is Postgres with **VectorChord**, which
 is what makes similarity search possible; a stock Postgres image will not work.
 `redis` is Valkey, the Redis fork, used as the job queue.
 **`env_file: .env` is a hard dependency.** Unlike every other stack here, where
 `.env` is optional because the compose file carries defaults, Compose will refuse
 to start this one if the file does not exist.
 **Images are digest-pinned** for Valkey and Postgres
 (`@sha256:…`), so those two are byte-identical to what upstream tested against
 this release. The Immich images themselves float on `${IMMICH_VERSION:-release}`
 — which is why pinning `IMMICH_VERSION` in `.env` matters.
 ## Gotchas
 - **Pin `IMMICH_VERSION` to a major.** Unset, it resolves to `release`, so a
  routine `docker compose pull` can carry you across a major version while your
  compose file stays behind. Upstream's own `example.env` now sets
  `IMMICH_VERSION=v3` for exactly this reason.
 - **The container media path changed, and it is easy to miss.** Older compose
  files mount `${UPLOAD_LOCATION}:/usr/src/app/upload`; since **v1.140.0** it is
  `${UPLOAD_LOCATION}:/data`, because `IMMICH_MEDIA_LOCATION` now defaults to
  `/data`. Run a new image against an old compose file and the server looks for
  your library at an unmounted path — it appears empty, and anything written
  goes into the container and is lost when it is recreated. If you are adopting
  this file over an older one, that mount line is the one to check first.
 - **`DB_DATA_LOCATION` must be local storage.** Not NFS, not SMB, not a
  network share of any kind. Postgres on a network filesystem corrupts, and
  upstream says so in the example env.
 - **Upgrading Postgres extensions is a real migration.** The image here is
  `14-vectorchord0.4.3-pgvectors0.2.0`; moving from an older VectorChord build
  makes Immich alter the database on first boot, which "can take seconds to
  minutes". Back up `DB_DATA_LOCATION` before any version jump, and read
  [the upgrade notes](https://docs.immich.app/install/upgrading/).
 - **`shm_size: 128mb` on the database is load-bearing**, not decoration.
  Postgres uses shared memory for larger queries and Docker's 64 MB default is
  not enough here. Upstream's upgrade guide lists adding it as a required step.
 - **`DB_STORAGE_TYPE: 'HDD'` is commented out** in the database environment.
  Uncomment it if the Postgres data directory sits on a spinning disk — it tunes
  the planner's assumptions about random reads. Leave it alone on SSD or NVMe.
 - **Back up `UPLOAD_LOCATION` and `DB_DATA_LOCATION` together.** The files are
  the photos; the database holds every album, face cluster, share and edit.
  Either alone is most of a disaster.
 - **The first import is expensive.** Machine learning runs over the whole
  library once. On a low-power box expect it to saturate the CPU for hours —
  the same caveat as [copyparty](../copyparty/README.md) on an N100, and worth
  scheduling rather than discovering.
 ## Exposing it
 The mobile apps talk to the same port as the browser, so whatever you put in
 front has to work for both.
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — the normal route.
  Raise the upload body limit or large videos fail on the way in.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — **the ~100 MB body cap is exactly
  the wrong limit for this.** A phone's 4K video will exceed it. Read
  [the limits](../docs/cloudflare-tunnel.md) first.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — Immich speaks OIDC
  natively, so use that rather than forward auth, which would break every mobile
  client. Keep a local admin account until the flow is proven.
 ## Links
 - Install guide: <https://docs.immich.app/install/docker-compose>
 - Release compose file: <https://github.com/immich-app/immich/releases/latest/download/docker-compose.yml>
 - Environment variables: <https://docs.immich.app/install/environment-variables>
 - Upgrading: <https://docs.immich.app/install/upgrading/>
 - Hardware-accelerated ML: <https://docs.immich.app/features/ml-hardware-acceleration>
 - Compose builder: <https://immich.app/docker-compose-builder>
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
 #
 # WARNING: To install Immich, follow our guide: https://docs.immich.app/install/docker-compose
 #
 # Make sure to use the docker-compose.yml of the current release:
 #
 # https://github.com/immich-app/immich/releases/latest/download/docker-compose.yml
 #
 # The compose file on main may not be compatible with the latest release.
 name: immich
 services:
  immich-server:
    container_name: immich_server
    image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-server:${IMMICH_VERSION:-release}
    # extends:
    #   file: hwaccel.transcoding.yml
    #   service: cpu # set to one of [nvenc, quicksync, rkmpp, vaapi, vaapi-wsl] for accelerated transcoding
    volumes:
      # Do not edit the next line. If you want to change the media storage location on your system, edit the value of UPLOAD_LOCATION in the .env file
      - ${UPLOAD_LOCATION}:/data
      - /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro
    env_file:
      - .env
    ports:
      - '2283:2283'
    depends_on:
      - redis
      - database
    restart: always
    healthcheck:
      disable: false
  immich-machine-learning:
    container_name: immich_machine_learning
    # For hardware acceleration, add one of -[armnn, cuda, rocm, openvino, rknn] to the image tag.
    # Example tag: ${IMMICH_VERSION:-release}-cuda
    image: ghcr.io/immich-app/immich-machine-learning:${IMMICH_VERSION:-release}
    # extends: # uncomment this section for hardware acceleration - see https://docs.immich.app/features/ml-hardware-acceleration
    #   file: hwaccel.ml.yml
    #   service: cpu # set to one of [armnn, cuda, rocm, openvino, openvino-wsl, rknn] for accelerated inference - use the `-wsl` version for WSL2 where applicable
    volumes:
      - model-cache:/cache
    env_file:
      - .env
    restart: always
    healthcheck:
      disable: false
  redis:
    container_name: immich_redis
    image: docker.io/valkey/valkey:9@sha256:70739f85ad2ee01a726a965584a0f94895f01b0c60b3cc8b0aeef11eaa6888cf
    healthcheck:
      test: redis-cli ping | grep -q PONG || exit 1
    restart: always
  database:
    container_name: immich_postgres
    image: ghcr.io/immich-app/postgres:14-vectorchord0.4.3-pgvectors0.2.0@sha256:bcf63357191b76a916ae5eb93464d65c07511da41e3bf7a8416db519b40b1c23
    environment:
      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${DB_PASSWORD}
      POSTGRES_USER: ${DB_USERNAME}
      POSTGRES_DB: ${DB_DATABASE_NAME}
      POSTGRES_INITDB_ARGS: '--data-checksums'
      # Uncomment the DB_STORAGE_TYPE: 'HDD' var if your database isn't stored on SSDs
      # DB_STORAGE_TYPE: 'HDD'
    volumes:
      # Do not edit the next line. If you want to change the database storage location on your system, edit the value of DB_DATA_LOCATION in the .env file
      - ${DB_DATA_LOCATION}:/var/lib/postgresql/data
    shm_size: 128mb
    restart: always
    healthcheck:
      disable: false
 volumes:
  model-cache:
@@ -100,40 +100,8 @@ Publishes plain HTTP; nothing here is proxy-aware.
 - [Caddy reverse proxy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — what I do.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../docs/cloudflare-tunnel.md) — **not for this one.**
  Streaming video through a tunnel breaks Cloudflare's terms and performs badly.
- [Authentik SSO](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — forward auth works for the web UI
+- [Authentik SSO](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — works for the web UI, but native
-  but breaks every native client, so use a plugin instead. See below.
+  clients can't handle a forward-auth login page.
 ## Single sign-on with Authentik
 Needs a reverse proxy in front, same as anything else doing OIDC — see
 [Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md).
 **Authentik's own guide takes a different route than I did.**
 [Their Jellyfin page](https://integrations.goauthentik.io/media/jellyfin/)
 documents the **LDAP** approach: an LDAP provider plus an outpost, talking to
 Jellyfin's *LDAP Authentication* plugin. Their reasoning is that Jellyfin has no
 native external authentication. That works, but it means running an outpost and
 managing a bind user.
 I used the **SSO-Auth** plugin instead, which does OIDC against Authentik
 directly — no outpost, no LDAP bind. If you follow their page and wonder why
 none of the screens match, that's why.
 ### The setting that cost me the time
 **Scheme Override → `https`.**
 If the plugin redirects you to an *insecure* URL — you land on `http://` mid-login
 and it fails — this is the fix. Behind a TLS-terminating proxy, Jellyfin sees a
 plain HTTP request and builds the callback from that, so the redirect goes out as
 `http://` even though everything the browser touches is HTTPS.
 Tracked upstream at
 [goauthentik/authentik#15936](https://github.com/goauthentik/authentik/issues/15936).
 Note this is the same class of problem as `JELLYFIN_PublishedServerUrl` in
 `compose.yaml`: Jellyfin builds absolute URLs from what it observes, and behind a
 proxy what it observes is wrong until you tell it otherwise.
 ## Links
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 #
 # NOTE: compose.yaml currently sets these values literally in its
 # `environment:` block, so nothing here is read yet. Switch a line to
 # ${VAR} in compose.yaml to start using it -- worth doing for the two
 # marked SECRET below, which should never sit in a committed file.
 # ─── Basics ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #TITLE=LibreSpeed
 #TAGLINE=
 # Port on the host; the container always listens on WEBPORT (8080).
 #PORT=3011
 # ─── Telemetry: off by default ──────────────────────────────────────
 # Turn this on and results are stored -- which needs a database AND a
 # volume, neither of which compose.yaml has today. See the README.
 #TELEMETRY=false
 # SECRET. Protects the stats page at /results/stats.php. Required once
 # telemetry is on, or anyone can read every result.
 #PASSWORD=
 # Shown in the privacy policy as the contact for deletion requests.
 # Required for a production install with telemetry. NOTE: the old EMAIL
 # variable is deprecated -- this is the current name.
 #GDPR_EMAIL=you@example.com
 # Telemetry logs client IPs unless you turn this on.
 #REDACT_IP_ADDRESSES=false
 #ENABLE_ID_OBFUSCATION=false
 # 2-byte hex, e.g. 0x1234abcd. Random if unset -- which means IDs change
 # every restart.
 #OBFUSCATION_SALT=
 # ─── Database (only when TELEMETRY=true) ────────────────────────────
 # sqlite needs /database mounted or results vanish on recreate.
 #DB_TYPE=sqlite
 #DB_NAME=
 #DB_HOSTNAME=
 #DB_PORT=
 #DB_USERNAME=
 #DB_PASSWORD=
 # ─── ISP name and distance ──────────────────────────────────────────
 # SECRET. From ipinfo.io. Without it there is no ISP name, and DISTANCE
 # does nothing.
 #IPINFO_APIKEY=
 #DISABLE_IPINFO=false
 # km, mi, or empty to hide it. Needs IPINFO_APIKEY.
 #DISTANCE=km
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
 # LibreSpeed
 A speed test you host yourself. One container, no Flash, no Java, no account —
 open the page and it measures the link between the browser and *your* server.
 That last part is the whole point and the whole catch: this does not tell you
 how fast your internet is. It tells you how fast the path to this box is, which
 is the more useful number when you are debugging your own LAN, your VPN, or a
 neighbour's Wi-Fi — and a meaningless one if you point it through a CDN.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:3011`. There is nothing to configure and no `.env` needed
 for the default read-only setup — see [`.env.example`](.env.example) for what
 becomes relevant once you turn telemetry on.
 ## Ports
 | Host | Container | Purpose |
 |------|-----------|---------|
 | 3011 | 8080 | Web UI and the test endpoints |
 The container port follows `WEBPORT`, which defaults to 8080.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **`MODE: standalone`** means one container is both the page and the test
 endpoint. The alternatives matter only at scale: `backend` is a bare test point,
 `frontend` serves a UI that talks to a list of remote backends, and `dual` is
 both. For a single box, standalone is the whole story.
 **No volumes, because telemetry is off.** With `TELEMETRY` unset the container
 stores nothing and is entirely disposable — `docker compose down` costs you
 nothing. The moment you enable it, that stops being true; see the gotchas.
 **Most of the environment block is commented out on purpose.** It is upstream's
 menu of options kept close to hand, which is more useful in a file you revisit
 once a year than a link to documentation.
 ## Gotchas
 - **Turning on telemetry needs a volume that isn't there.** `TELEMETRY: "true"`
  stores results in sqlite by default, inside the container, at `/database`.
  With no volume mounted the results survive restarts but vanish the moment the
  container is recreated — which is to say, on the next `docker compose pull`.
  Add `- ./data:/database` before enabling it.
 - **Telemetry also wants `PASSWORD`**, which protects the stats page at
  `/results/stats.php`. Without it, anyone who finds the URL can read every
  result you've recorded, including client IPs.
 - **`EMAIL` is deprecated — the current name is `GDPR_EMAIL`.** It is the
  address shown in the privacy policy for deletion requests, and upstream
  considers it required for a production install with telemetry on. The
  commented block in `compose.yaml` still uses the old name.
 - **Results log client IP addresses by default.** `REDACT_IP_ADDRESSES: "true"`
  turns that off. Worth thinking about before you hand the URL to guests.
 - **`DISTANCE` does nothing without `IPINFO_APIKEY`**, and that key is a
  credential — it belongs in `.env` and a `${IPINFO_APIKEY}` reference, never in
  the committed compose file.
 - **A slow result may be your server, not your network.** The test works by
  generating and swallowing garbage data, so on a low-power host the CPU can cap
  the number before the link does. If you see a suspiciously round ceiling,
  check `docker stats` while a test runs — the same trap as
  [copyparty on an N100](../copyparty/README.md).
 - **`:latest` is unpinned.** Note the Docker tags drop the `v` that the git tags
  carry: the release is `v6.3.0`, the image tag is **`6.3.0`** (also `6.3`, `6`,
  and `-alpine` variants of each). Pinning `v6.3.0` fails with a manifest error
  that looks like a network problem.
 - **`restart: always` rather than `unless-stopped`**, so a deliberate stop does
  not survive a reboot. The rest of this repo uses the latter.
 ## Exposing it
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — works, but understand
  what you are then measuring: the path to the proxy, shaped by whatever the
  proxy does. For a LAN test, reach it directly by IP and skip the proxy.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — **no.** This is a tool whose job
  is to move as many gigabytes as it can for as long as you let it. Putting it
  behind a tunnel produces a number that measures Cloudflare, while pushing
  bulk transfer through a service not meant to carry it.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — forward auth fits
  fine; it is a browser-only app with no accounts of its own. Sensible if this
  faces the internet, though a public speed test is also a free bandwidth sink
  for whoever finds it.
 ## Links
 - Upstream: <https://github.com/librespeed/speedtest>
 - Docker options: <https://github.com/librespeed/speedtest/blob/master/doc_docker.md>
 - Image: <https://github.com/librespeed/speedtest/pkgs/container/speedtest>
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
 services:
  speedtest:
    container_name: speedtest
    image: ghcr.io/librespeed/speedtest:latest
    restart: unless-stopped
    environment:
      MODE: standalone
      TITLE: "Gooyban's Speed Meter"
      #TELEMETRY: "false"
      #ENABLE_ID_OBFUSCATION: "false"
      #REDACT_IP_ADDRESSES: "false"
      #PASSWORD:
      #GDPR_EMAIL::
      #DISABLE_IPINFO: "false"
      #IPINFO_APIKEY: "your api key"
      #DISTANCE: "km"
      #WEBPORT: 8080
    ports:
      - "3011:8080" # webport mapping (host:container)
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # Everything here has a default in compose.yaml, so a fresh clone runs
 # with no .env at all.
 # ─── Version ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Defaults to `latest`, which is worth knowing about: upstream's last
 # tagged release is v1.0.9 from May 2024, and `latest` is that same image.
 # It will move if and when a new release is tagged. Active development
 # ships separately as `development`, rebuilt Aug 2026.
 #
 #   latest       follows releases; today that is the May 2024 build
 #   1.0.9        the same image, named explicitly
 #   development  current build
 #
 #MYSPEED_TAG=latest
 # ─── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # The SQLite history database and every setting -- schedule, retention,
 # provider, alerts. Months of measurements live here and nothing in it
 # regenerates. This is the whole backup.
 #DATA_PATH=./data
 # ─── Ports ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #PORT=5216
 # ─── Timezone ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # There is no TZ variable to set: MySpeed takes no environment
 # configuration at all, and the image documents none. Since tests run on
 # cron expressions, container time decides when they fire -- UTC unless
 # you uncomment the two clock mounts in compose.yaml.
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
 # MySpeed
 Speed test *history*. It runs a test on a cron schedule, keeps the results for as
 long as you tell it to, and draws the graph — so you can answer "is it slow right
 now, or has it been slow every evening for a fortnight?"
 Pairs with [librespeed](../librespeed/) rather than competing with it: that one
 is an on-demand test you open when you want a number, this one is the unattended
 recorder. MySpeed can even use LibreSpeed as its measurement backend — it offers
 **Ookla, LibreSpeed and Cloudflare** as test providers, so the instance next door
 can be the thing it measures against.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env     # optional -- every value has a default
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:5216`. Everything — schedule, retention, provider, alerts —
 is configured in the web UI, not in this file.
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 5216 | http | Web UI and API |
 ## Why it looks like this
 **A bind mount instead of upstream's named volume.** The official install is
 `docker run -v myspeed:/myspeed/data`, a Docker-managed volume. Here it is
 `${DATA_PATH:-./data}`, so the history database sits next to the compose file
 where you can see it and a backup job can find it without knowing Docker's
 layout. Same reasoning as [jellyfin](../jellyfin/README.md)'s `/config`.
 **MySpeed itself takes no environment configuration** — no `PUID`, no `TZ`, no
 options. State and settings both live in the SQLite database in that one
 directory, which makes the stack trivially portable and the backup story simple:
 copy the directory. The variables in `.env.example` are therefore Compose-level
 only: the image tag, the host port, and where that directory lives.
 ## Gotchas
 - **`latest` is a build from May 2024.** The project is alive — the repository
  was pushed to in September 2026 — but the last tagged release is `v1.0.9` and
  Docker Hub's `latest` still points at that same image:
  | Tag | Pushed | Size | Digest |
  |-----|--------|------|--------|
  | `development` | 2026-08-02 | 102 MB | `sha256:043c2f00…` |
  | `latest` | 2024-05-21 | 59 MB | `sha256:3a3e774b…` |
  | `1.0.9` | 2024-05-21 | 59 MB | `sha256:3a3e774b…` |
  So `latest` here does not mean recent — it means "the newest *release*", and
  there hasn't been one since May 2024. It will start moving again if upstream
  tags one. Until then, "update to the newest version" means
  `MYSPEED_TAG=development`, which is a choice to make knowingly rather than a
  `docker compose pull` away.
 - **Scheduled tests run on container time.** The whole feature is cron
  expressions, and the image documents no `TZ` variable — so "run at 03:00" is
  03:00 **UTC** unless you tell the container otherwise. The two clock mounts are
  in `compose.yaml`, commented out; uncomment them to follow the host instead.
  They are off by default because turning them on shifts every existing schedule
  by your UTC offset. Same class of trap as the cron container in
  [firefly](../firefly/README.md).
 - **A speed test measures the path from *this box*.** If MySpeed runs on the NAS,
  the graph is the NAS's connectivity — which is usually what you want, but it is
  not your laptop's Wi-Fi. And a low-power host can cap the result on CPU before
  the link saturates; see [librespeed](../librespeed/README.md) for the same
  caveat.
 - **Back up the data directory.** Months of measurements and every setting are in
  there, and nothing regenerates.
 ## What else it does
 Worth knowing about before you go looking for another tool:
 - **Health checks with alerting** — email, Signal, WhatsApp or Telegram when a
  test fails or the line goes down.
 - **Prometheus and Grafana export**, if you would rather graph this beside
  everything else.
 - **Multiple servers on one instance**, so a single dashboard can watch more than
  one site.
 - **Configurable retention**, from a few days to forever.
 ## Exposing it
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md) — fine; the UI is just a
  dashboard, and the tests run server-side regardless of how you reach it.
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — fine for the dashboard, unlike
  [librespeed](../librespeed/README.md): the measurements do not travel through
  the tunnel, only the page does.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — forward auth suits
  it: browser-only, no accounts of its own. MySpeed has no authentication
  built in, so anyone who reaches the port can change the schedule and read the
  history.
 ## Links
 - Upstream: <https://github.com/gnmyt/MySpeed>
 - Website and docs: <https://myspeed.dev> · <https://docs.myspeed.dev/setup/linux>
 - Image: <https://hub.docker.com/r/germannewsmaker/myspeed>
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
 name: myspeed
 services:
    myspeed:
        # Note what `latest` means here: upstream's last tagged release is
        # v1.0.9 from May 2024, and `latest` still points at that same image.
        # Active development ships as `development` (rebuilt Aug 2026), so
        # set MYSPEED_TAG=development in .env if you want the current build.
        image: germannewsmaker/myspeed:${MYSPEED_TAG:-latest}
        container_name: myspeed
        restart: unless-stopped
        ports:
            - "${PORT:-5216}:5216"
        volumes:
            # History database and every setting MySpeed has. This directory
            # is the entire backup -- nothing in it regenerates.
            - ${DATA_PATH:-./data}:/myspeed/data
            # MySpeed schedules tests with cron expressions and reads no TZ
            # variable, so container time decides when they run -- UTC by
            # default. Uncomment to follow the host clock instead.
            #- /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro
            #- /etc/timezone:/etc/timezone:ro
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # ─── Which image ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # This is the only setting that changes what the stack actually is.
 # README.md has the full comparison; the short version:
 #
 #   main     WebUI only, CPU. Models run somewhere else.      (default)
 #   latest   identical to main — both are the same rolling build
 #   cuda     + CUDA runtime. Speeds up RAG embeddings and Whisper STT,
 #            NOT chat. Needs an NVIDIA host + Container Toolkit.
 #   ollama   + Ollama bundled inside the same container.
 #   v0.11.0  a frozen release. main/latest move under you.
 #
 #OWUI_TAG=main
 # With OWUI_TAG=cuda or ollama on an NVIDIA host, also uncomment
 # `gpus: all` in compose.yaml — the tag alone does not grant GPU access.
 # ─── Where the models are ───────────────────────────────────────────
 # Skip this and set it in the UI instead if you prefer.
 #   Ollama on the Docker host      http://host.docker.internal:11434
 #   Ollama in another container    http://ollama:11434
 #   Ollama on a Mac or other box   http://192.168.1.x:11434
 #   OWUI_TAG=ollama                leave unset — it is already local
 #OLLAMA_BASE_URL=http://host.docker.internal:11434
 # ─── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Chats, users, settings, RAG vector DB and model caches. Back this up.
 #DATA_PATH=./open-webui
 # Pulled Ollama models. ONLY used with OWUI_TAG=ollama, and only if you
 # uncomment the matching line in compose.yaml. Tens of GB.
 #OLLAMA_PATH=./ollama
 # ─── Ports ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #PORT=3033
 #TZ=Europe/Paris
 # ─── Optional ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Signs session cookies. Generated into DATA_PATH when unset, which is fine
 # for a single instance. Set it explicitly if you move the data between
 # hosts, otherwise everyone gets logged out.
 #WEBUI_SECRET_KEY=
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
 # Open WebUI
 Chat interface for local and remote LLMs. One container, one `.env` line to
 decide which of three quite different stacks you get.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 $EDITOR .env            # pick OWUI_TAG, point it at your models
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 Open `http://<host>:3033`. The first account created becomes the admin.
 ## Choosing a tag
 `OWUI_TAG` in `.env` is the whole configuration. Everything else is detail.
 | Tag | What's inside | Choose it when |
 |---|---|---|
 | **`main`** / `latest` | WebUI only | Models run somewhere else — the Docker host, another machine, a Mac, or a hosted API. **The default, and the right answer most of the time.** |
 | **`cuda`** | + CUDA runtime | You're on an NVIDIA host **and** use document RAG or voice input |
 | **`ollama`** | + Ollama bundled in | One machine, one container, models managed inside it |
 | `dev` | main branch, unreleased | Testing only |
 | `v0.11.0` | a frozen release | You want upgrades to be a decision, not a surprise |
 `main` and `latest` are the same rolling image — upstream says so explicitly.
 Version tags stay frozen.
 ### What `cuda` actually accelerates
 Not your chat. Open WebUI does not run LLMs; Ollama does. The image's own
 environment says what the CUDA build is for:
 ```
 SENTENCE_TRANSFORMERS_HOME=/app/backend/data/cache/embedding/models
 WHISPER_MODEL_DIR=/app/backend/data/cache/whisper/models
 USE_CUDA_DOCKER_VER=cu128
 ```
 Embeddings for document chat, and Whisper speech-to-text. If you don't use
 either, `cuda` buys you a much larger image and nothing else. If you do use
 them, it's the difference between instant and a visible pause.
 **The tag alone doesn't grant GPU access.** You also have to uncomment
 `gpus: all` in `compose.yaml` and have the NVIDIA Container Toolkit installed
 on the host. Getting one without the other is the usual reason "the GPU isn't
 being used".
 ### On Apple silicon, don't use `ollama`
 Docker on macOS runs in a VM with **no GPU passthrough** — Metal is not
 reachable from a container. The bundled `ollama` tag will work and will be
 miserably slow, because inference falls back to CPU.
 The right shape on a Mac is Ollama installed natively, where it uses Metal,
 with Open WebUI in Docker pointing at it:
 ```bash
 OWUI_TAG=main
 OLLAMA_BASE_URL=http://host.docker.internal:11434
 ```
 Same applies to any machine where the GPU belongs to something other than
 Docker.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **One compose file, not three.** The three variants differ by an image tag and
 two optional lines. Keeping separate directories per variant meant fixing every
 bug three times, and the differences — the interesting part — weren't written
 down anywhere.
 **`extra_hosts: host.docker.internal:host-gateway`** is always present, even
 though only the "Ollama on the host" case needs it. It costs nothing when
 unused and is the single most common thing people are missing when the WebUI
 can't see their models.
 **The Ollama volume is commented out.** It's meaningless except with
 `OWUI_TAG=ollama`, and mounting it otherwise creates a stray empty directory
 that looks like it should contain something.
 **`WEBUI_SECRET_KEY` is optional and empty.** The image generates one into the
 data directory on first run. That's fine until you move the data to another
 host, at which point a regenerated key logs everyone out.
 ## Gotchas
 - **Switching tags keeps your data.** `DATA_PATH` holds chats, users and
  settings regardless of tag, so moving between `main` and `ollama` is safe.
  Your *models* are a different story — those live in `OLLAMA_PATH` and only
  exist for the bundled tag.
 - **`:main` is a rolling tag.** `docker compose pull` can bring a different
  version any day. Pin `OWUI_TAG=v0.11.0` if you'd rather upgrade deliberately.
 - **The container runs as root** (`User: 0:0` in the image config) and has no
  `PUID`/`PGID` support. On rootless Docker this is a non-issue; on rootful,
  expect `DATA_PATH` files to be root-owned.
 - **The data directory gets big.** It holds the RAG vector DB and cached
  embedding models, not just chats.
 ## Exposing it
 - [Reverse proxy with Caddy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md)
 - [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) — fine for this one; chat is
  low-bandwidth. Watch the ~100 MB cap if you upload documents for RAG.
 - [Single sign-on with Authentik](../docs/authentik-sso.md) — Open WebUI
  supports OIDC directly, which is nicer than forward auth here.
 ## Links
 - Quick start: <https://docs.openwebui.com/getting-started/quick-start>
 - Image: <https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pkgs/container/open-webui>
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
 services:
  open-webui:
    # The TAG decides what is inside the image — full comparison in README.md.
    #   main / latest   WebUI only, CPU. Models live elsewhere.   (default)
    #   cuda            + CUDA runtime for RAG embeddings and STT
    #   ollama          + Ollama bundled in the same container
    #   v0.11.0         a frozen release; main/latest are rolling
    image: ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:${OWUI_TAG:-main}
    container_name: open-webui
    restart: unless-stopped
    environment:
      - TZ=${TZ:-Etc/UTC}
      # Where the models are. Leave commented to pick it in the UI instead.
      #   Ollama on the Docker host    -> http://host.docker.internal:11434
      #   Ollama in another container   -> http://ollama:11434
      #   Ollama on a Mac / another box -> http://<its-ip>:11434
      #   OWUI_TAG=ollama (bundled)     -> leave unset, it is already local
      #- OLLAMA_BASE_URL=${OLLAMA_BASE_URL}
      # Session signing key. Generated into the data dir when unset — set it
      # explicitly if you ever move the data to another host.
      #- WEBUI_SECRET_KEY=${WEBUI_SECRET_KEY}
    volumes:
      - ${DATA_PATH:-./open-webui}:/app/backend/data
      # ONLY with OWUI_TAG=ollama — where pulled models are stored. Expect tens
      # of GB. Leave commented for every other tag.
      #- ${OLLAMA_PATH:-./ollama}:/root/.ollama
    ports:
      - "${PORT:-3033}:8080"
    # Lets the container reach an Ollama running on the Docker host.
    extra_hosts:
      - host.docker.internal:host-gateway
    # ─── NVIDIA GPU ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    # Uncomment with OWUI_TAG=cuda or OWUI_TAG=ollama on an NVIDIA host.
    # Needs the NVIDIA Container Toolkit installed. Does nothing on Apple
    # silicon — Docker cannot reach the GPU there at all. See the README.
    #gpus: all
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
 name: openwebui
 services:
    open-webui:
        ports:
            - 3033:8080
        extra_hosts:
            - host.docker.internal:host-gateway
        volumes:
            - ./open-webui:/app/backend/data
        container_name: open-webui
        restart: always
        image: ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main
 volumes:
    open-webui:
        external: true
        name: open-webui
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
 # Copy to .env and adjust. .env is git-ignored; this file is not.
 # ─── Required ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Signs project invite tokens. Generate your own -- do not reuse anyone's:
 #
 #   openssl rand -base64 32
 #
 OVERLEAF_INVITE_TOKEN_SECRET=
 # ─── Public address ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Every generated link is built from this: account activation, password
 # reset, project invites. Overleaf defaults to http://localhost, so links
 # come out wrong the moment you use a port or a domain -- and you only find
 # out when someone can't reset their password.
 #
 #   local, non-standard port   http://192.168.1.50:8020
 #   behind a reverse proxy     https://overleaf.example.com
 #
 OVERLEAF_SITE_URL=http://localhost:8020
 # ─── Basics ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #OVERLEAF_APP_NAME=Overleaf
 #PORT=8020
 # Where Mongo, Redis and Overleaf keep their data. Projects live here --
 # this is the directory to back up.
 #DATA_PATH=./data
 # ─── HTTPS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Serving over TLS? Uncomment OVERLEAF_SECURE_COOKIE in compose.yaml.
 # Careful: the code checks `!= null`, so setting it to "false" turns it ON.
 # The only way to disable it is to leave it unset.
@@ -1,296 +0,0 @@
 # Overleaf
 Self-hosted LaTeX editor — the Community Edition of overleaf.com. Real-time
 collaborative editing, compiles server-side, keeps a full TeX Live install so
 you don't maintain one locally.
 ## Quick start
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
 echo "OVERLEAF_INVITE_TOKEN_SECRET=$(openssl rand -base64 32)" >> .env
 $EDITOR .env            # set OVERLEAF_SITE_URL
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 First boot takes a minute or two. Then create the first admin account — see
 below, there is no signup form at all.
 ## Adding users
 Community Edition has **no public registration**. `/register` exists but renders
 a page pointing at an admin rather than a form, and there's no setting to open
 it up. Accounts are created one at a time by you.
 ```bash
 # the first account -- make it an admin
 docker compose exec sharelatex bash -c \
  'cd /overleaf/services/web && node modules/server-ce-scripts/scripts/create-user.mjs --admin --email=you@example.com'
 # everyone after that -- drop --admin
 docker compose exec sharelatex bash -c \
  'cd /overleaf/services/web && node modules/server-ce-scripts/scripts/create-user.mjs --email=someone@example.com'
 ```
 The command prints an activation URL:
 ```
 http://overleaf.example.com/user/activate?token=<token>&user_id=<id>
 ```
 **Send that link to the person yourself.** No mail is configured here, so
 Overleaf's attempt to email it goes nowhere. They open it, choose their own
 password, and they're in — there's no confirmation step, since
 `EMAIL_CONFIRMATION_DISABLED` is set.
 The host in that URL comes from `OVERLEAF_SITE_URL`. Get that wrong and the
 link points somewhere unreachable — it defaults to bare `http://localhost`.
 Once an admin exists you can do the same thing from the web UI at
 **Admin → Manage Users**, which shows the activation link on screen. Same
 result; the CLI is just faster over SSH.
 On OMV, use `docker exec` instead of `docker compose exec` — see
 [Running it on OpenMediaVault](#running-it-on-openmediavault).
 ## Ports
 | Port | Proto | Purpose |
 |------|-------|---------|
 | 8020 | http | Web UI (container listens on 80) |
 Mongo and Redis are reachable only on the internal compose network.
 ## Why it looks like this
 **Four containers, not one.** The app, MongoDB, Redis, and a one-shot replica-set
 initializer. Overleaf is a small distributed system pretending to be an app.
 **Mongo runs as a replica set** (`--replSet overleaf`) even though there's one
 node. Overleaf uses transactions and change streams, which Mongo only provides
 in replica-set mode. Something has to call `rs.initiate()` exactly once, which
 is what [`init/mongodb-init-replica-set.js`](init/mongodb-init-replica-set.js)
 does — Mongo runs anything in `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/` on first start
 against an empty data directory. Skip this and Overleaf hangs at boot with
 errors that don't mention replica sets.
 `extra_hosts: mongo:127.0.0.1` is part of the same trick: the init script
 registers the member as `mongo:27017`, so during initialization the container
 has to resolve its own service name.
 **No `SANDBOXED_COMPILES`.** Upstream's sample `docker-compose.yml` ships these
 *enabled*:
 ```yaml
 SANDBOXED_COMPILES: "true"
 DOCKER_RUNNER: "true"
 SANDBOXED_COMPILES_SIBLING_CONTAINERS: "true"
 ```
 Directly above them, its own comment says sandboxed compiles are Server Pro
 only and "must be commented out to avoid compile issues" on Community Edition.
 Copy that file as-is and your documents don't compile. They're absent here on
 purpose.
 **The image is pinned to `6.2.2`.** Upstream's sample is unpinned. This is a
 database-backed service with schema migrations between majors — an unattended
 `docker compose pull` picking up a new major is not something you want to
 discover on a Sunday.
 **`container_name: overleaf-mongo` / `overleaf-redis`**, while the *service*
 names stay `mongo` and `redis`. The service names are load-bearing —
 `OVERLEAF_MONGO_URL: mongodb://mongo/sharelatex` resolves them — but upstream's
 `container_name: mongo` would claim a very generic name on the host and collide
 with the next stack that wants it.
 **`stop_grace_period: 60s`** so in-flight compiles finish instead of being
 killed mid-run.
 ## Behind your own domain
 Set the public URL — this is the setting people miss:
 ```bash
 # .env
 OVERLEAF_SITE_URL=https://overleaf.example.com
 ```
 Then uncomment `OVERLEAF_SECURE_COOKIE` in `compose.yaml`.
 Caddy, which handles WebSockets automatically (Overleaf needs them for
 collaborative editing and the compile log):
 ```caddy
 overleaf.example.com {
    reverse_proxy 192.168.1.50:8020
 }
 ```
 That's the whole config — Caddy gets the certificate itself. See
 [reverse proxy](../docs/reverse-proxy.md).
 A [Cloudflare Tunnel](../cloudflare-tunnel/) also works and passes WebSockets,
 but mind the ~100 MB upload cap if you bring in large figures or datasets.
 **Order matters:** change `OVERLEAF_SITE_URL` *before* creating accounts, or the
 activation links you've already sent point at the wrong host.
 ## Running it on OpenMediaVault
 Two things differ from a plain `docker compose up`, and both cost me an evening.
 **Copy `init/mongodb-init-replica-set.js` across before the first start.** OMV's
 compose plugin deploys the compose file and the env file, not the rest of the
 directory. If that script isn't on disk when Mongo first starts, Docker creates
 it as an empty *directory* — bind mounts do that for missing paths — Mongo skips
 it, and the replica set is never initialized.
 The symptom points nowhere near the cause: Mongo reports **healthy** while the
 app restart-loops with `500_check_db_access.sh failed with status 1`. Mongo's
 healthcheck only runs `db.stats().ok`, which succeeds fine without a replica set.
 If you've already started it, fix it in place — the entrypoint won't re-run once
 the data directory has data:
 ```bash
 docker exec overleaf-mongo mongosh --quiet --eval \
  'rs.initiate({_id:"overleaf",members:[{_id:0,host:"mongo:27017"}]})'
 docker restart overleaf
 ```
 **Use `docker exec`, not `docker compose`, for one-off commands.** OMV names the
 env file `<stack>.env`, and Compose only auto-loads a file called `.env`. So a
 manual compose command fails on the required variables even though the running
 stack is perfectly configured:
 ```
 required variable OVERLEAF_INVITE_TOKEN_SECRET is missing a value
 ```
 The container already has the environment, so talk to it directly:
 ```bash
 docker exec overleaf bash -c \
  'cd /overleaf/services/web && node modules/server-ce-scripts/scripts/create-user.mjs --admin --email=you@example.com'
 ```
 If you'd rather have compose work by hand too, symlink it once — OMV keeps
 passing its own `--env-file` and won't notice:
 ```bash
 ln -s overleaf.env .env
 ```
 ## Gotchas
 - **`OVERLEAF_SECURE_COOKIE` is tested with `!= null`.** Setting it to `"false"`
  turns secure cookies **on**. The only way to disable it is to leave it unset —
  and with it wrongly on over plain HTTP, login silently fails to stick.
 - **Mongo 8.0 needs AVX.** Mongo 5.0+ won't start on CPUs without it, and the
  failure is an immediate exit with nothing useful logged. Check first:
  `grep -o avx2 /proc/cpuinfo | head -1`
 - **`start_period` on Mongo's healthcheck is load-bearing.** Without it, slow
  checks during startup count against `retries` straight away — five of them
  (~50s) mark Mongo unhealthy, and the app's `condition: service_healthy`
  refuses to start it. Mongo then recovers on its next check, so by morning
  everything looks fine except the app, which is simply down. This bites on
  backup scripts that stop and start containers: Mongo comes back while the
  disks are still busy, `mongosh` is a Node process and answers slowly, and the
  stack loses a race nobody knew it was running. Upstream's sample has no
  `start_period` either.
 - **A healthy Mongo does not mean the replica set is up.** The healthcheck runs
  `db.stats().ok`, which passes without one — so `depends_on: service_healthy`
  is satisfied and the app starts anyway, then fails its own DB check.
 - **The replica-set script only runs on an empty data directory.** If Mongo has
  data but no replica set, initialize by hand:
  `docker compose exec mongo mongosh --eval 'rs.initiate({_id:"overleaf",members:[{_id:0,host:"mongo:27017"}]})'`
 - **No signup page until the first user exists.** Use the `create-user.mjs`
  script above; the web UI won't offer to make one.
 - **Missing LaTeX packages** — see the section below. The short version is
  `tlmgr --usermode install <pkg>`, not plain `tlmgr install`.
 - **Back up `DATA_PATH`.** `data/mongo` holds every project. `data/overleaf`
  holds uploaded files and compile output.
 - **Upgrading across majors** may need migrations, and Mongo itself can't jump
  several versions at once. Read the release notes rather than pulling blind.
 ## Installing LaTeX packages so they stay installed
 The image ships a reduced TeX Live, so a document can fail on a package that
 exists upstream — `booktabs` is a common first casualty. The obvious fix works
 and then quietly undoes itself:
 ```bash
 docker exec overleaf tlmgr install booktabs      # works now, gone after an upgrade
 ```
 TeX Live lives at `/usr/local/texlive/2026/`, **inside the image**. A
 `docker restart` keeps those files; recreating the container after
 `docker compose pull` does not. A document that compiled last month stops
 compiling and nothing tells you why.
 The fix is user-mode installs plus a `TEXMFHOME` that both users agree on.
 That second half matters more than it looks: **tlmgr runs as root, but the
 compiles run as `www-data`**, and by default those two resolve `TEXMFHOME`
 differently:
 ```
 root      /root/texmf        <- where a plain `tlmgr --usermode install` lands
 www-data  /var/www/texmf     <- where LaTeX actually looks
 ```
 So the install succeeds, reports no error, and the package still isn't found —
 and `/root` isn't even readable by `www-data`, so no amount of mounting that
 path helps. This stack therefore sets:
 ```yaml
 TEXMFHOME: /var/lib/overleaf/texmf
 ```
 which is inside the persisted volume, so both users agree and the packages
 survive image updates. Then:
 ```bash
 docker exec overleaf tlmgr --usermode init-usertree   # once
 docker exec overleaf tlmgr --usermode install booktabs
 ```
 Verify as the user that actually compiles, not as root:
 ```bash
 docker exec -u www-data overleaf kpsewhich booktabs.sty
 #  /var/lib/overleaf/texmf/...   correct, persisted
 #  /usr/local/texlive/...        inside the image, lost on update
 #  nothing                       installed somewhere the compiler can't see
 ```
 **Caveats.** User mode handles ordinary style packages cleanly. Packages that
 install fonts or need map-file updates may also want `updmap-user`, and a few
 that expect to modify the main tree won't work this way — install those with a
 custom image instead:
 ```dockerfile
 FROM sharelatex/sharelatex:6.2.2
 RUN tlmgr install <packages>
 ```
 That's the more reproducible option in general, since the package list ends up
 in version control. The trade is rebuilding on every upstream release. If you
 stay with user mode, keep a list of what you've installed — the volume survives,
 but a list is what lets you rebuild from nothing.
 ## Health checks
 The image ships its own:
 ```bash
 docker compose exec sharelatex bash -c 'cd /overleaf/services/web && node modules/server-ce-scripts/scripts/check-mongodb.mjs'
 docker compose exec sharelatex bash -c 'cd /overleaf/services/web && node modules/server-ce-scripts/scripts/check-redis.mjs'
 docker compose exec mongo mongosh --quiet --eval 'rs.status().members.map(m => m.name + " " + m.stateStr)'
 ```
 ## Links
 - Upstream repo: <https://github.com/overleaf/overleaf>
 - Their sample compose: <https://github.com/overleaf/overleaf/blob/main/docker-compose.yml>
 - The Toolkit (upstream's recommended installer): <https://github.com/overleaf/toolkit>
 - Image: <https://hub.docker.com/r/sharelatex/sharelatex>
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
 name: overleaf
 services:
  sharelatex:
    image: sharelatex/sharelatex:6.2.2
    container_name: overleaf
    restart: unless-stopped
    depends_on:
      mongo:
        condition: service_healthy
      redis:
        condition: service_started
    # Overleaf needs time to finish in-flight compiles on shutdown.
    stop_grace_period: 60s
    ports:
      - "${PORT:-8020}:80"
    volumes:
      - ${DATA_PATH:-./data}/overleaf:/var/lib/overleaf
    environment:
      OVERLEAF_APP_NAME: ${OVERLEAF_APP_NAME:-Overleaf}
      # These hostnames are compose SERVICE names, not container names.
      OVERLEAF_MONGO_URL: mongodb://mongo/sharelatex
      # One setting, two variable names. Upstream's own comment: "unfortunately".
      OVERLEAF_REDIS_HOST: redis
      REDIS_HOST: redis
      # Required for invite tokens. openssl rand -base64 32
      OVERLEAF_INVITE_TOKEN_SECRET: ${OVERLEAF_INVITE_TOKEN_SECRET:?generate with openssl rand -base64 32}
      # Public address. Every generated link -- activation, password reset,
      # project invite -- is built from this. Defaults to http://localhost,
      # which is wrong the moment you use a port or a domain.
      OVERLEAF_SITE_URL: ${OVERLEAF_SITE_URL:-http://localhost:8020}
      # Where `tlmgr --usermode install` puts packages. Overridden to a path on
      # the persisted volume so they survive an image update -- and so that root
      # (which runs tlmgr) and www-data (which runs the compiles) agree on one
      # location. Left at the default they disagree, and packages install to a
      # directory the compiler never searches. See the README.
      TEXMFHOME: /var/lib/overleaf/texmf
      ENABLED_LINKED_FILE_TYPES: "project_file,project_output_file"
      ENABLE_CONVERSIONS: "true"
      EMAIL_CONFIRMATION_DISABLED: "true"
      # Serving over HTTPS? Uncomment. The value is NOT parsed -- the code
      # tests `!= null`, so even "false" switches it ON. Comment it out to
      # disable, never set it to false.
      #OVERLEAF_SECURE_COOKIE: "true"
      # DO NOT add SANDBOXED_COMPILES / DOCKER_RUNNER here. Upstream's sample
      # ships them enabled, but they are Server Pro only and break compiles on
      # Community Edition. See the README.
  mongo:
    image: mongo:8.0
    container_name: overleaf-mongo
    restart: unless-stopped
    # Overleaf uses transactions, which require replica-set mode even on one node.
    command: "--replSet overleaf"
    volumes:
      - ${DATA_PATH:-./data}/mongo:/data/db
      - ./init/mongodb-init-replica-set.js:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/mongodb-init-replica-set.js:ro
    environment:
      MONGO_INITDB_DATABASE: sharelatex
    # rs.initiate() registers the member as "mongo:27017", so during init the
    # container has to resolve that name to itself.
    extra_hosts:
      - mongo:127.0.0.1
    healthcheck:
      test: echo 'db.stats().ok' | mongosh localhost:27017/test --quiet
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 20s
      retries: 5
      # Without this, failures during startup count against `retries`
      # immediately: five slow checks (~50s) mark Mongo unhealthy, and the app's
      # `condition: service_healthy` then refuses to start. Mongo recovers a
      # moment later, so by morning nothing looks wrong. `mongosh` is a Node
      # process and is slow to answer on a loaded box -- e.g. right after a
      # backup job. During start_period a failure is not counted, and a success
      # promotes to healthy straight away.
      start_period: 120s
  redis:
    image: redis:6.2
    container_name: overleaf-redis
    restart: unless-stopped
    volumes:
      - ${DATA_PATH:-./data}/redis:/data
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
 volumes:
  web:
  mongo:
  redis:
  mongo-init-replica:
 services:
  web:
    image: sharelatex/sharelatex:4.2.3@sha256:6c6498de22775f1227eed7cf472c764aa851f0fe5b9e640d989ea8a90837159e
    depends_on:
      mongo:
        condition: service_healthy
      redis:
        condition: service_started
    links:
      - mongo
      - redis
    ports:
      - 8020:80
    volumes:
      - ./data/sharelatex:/var/lib/sharelatex
    environment:
      SHARELATEX_APP_NAME: Overleaf
      SHARELATEX_MONGO_URL: mongodb://mongo/sharelatex
      SHARELATEX_REDIS_HOST: redis
      REDIS_HOST: redis
      ENABLED_LINKED_FILE_TYPES: "project_file,project_output_file"
      ENABLE_CONVERSIONS: "true"
      EMAIL_CONFIRMATION_DISABLED: "true"
      TEXMFVAR: /var/lib/sharelatex/tmp/texmf-var
  mongo:
    image: mongo:4.4@sha256:52c42cbab240b3c5b1748582cc13ef46d521ddacae002bbbda645cebed270ec0
    command: "--replSet overleaf"
    expose:
      - 27017
    volumes:
      - ./data/mongo:/data/db
    healthcheck:
      test: echo 'db.stats().ok' | mongo localhost:27017/test --quiet
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 10s
      retries: 5
  redis:
    image: redis:6.2@sha256:5610a8ffeaf386ecc7b6c8f070662a7a9d01bc7eafe237152a7d16e05b84afc9
    expose:
      - 6379
    volumes:
      - ./data/redis:/data
  mongo-init-replica:
    image: mongo:4.4
    depends_on:
      - mongo
    entrypoint: >
      bash -c "
      until mongo --host mongo --eval 'print(\"waiting for mongo\")'; do sleep 2; done;
      mongo --host mongo --eval 'rs.initiate({_id: \"overleaf\", members: [{_id: 0, host: \"mongo:27017\"}]})'"
    restart: "on-failure"
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
 // Mounted into Mongo's /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/ and run ONCE, on the very
 // first start against an empty data directory. Overleaf needs transactions,
 // which Mongo only offers in replica-set mode -- even for a single node.
 //
 // If you ever wipe ./data/mongo, this runs again. If Mongo has data but no
 // replica set, it does NOT run and you must call rs.initiate() by hand.
 rs.initiate({ _id: 'overleaf', members: [{ _id: 0, host: 'mongo:27017' }] })
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 name: obwi-with-ollama
 services:
    open-webui:
        ports:
            - 3034:8080
        volumes:
            - ./ollama:/root/.ollama
            - ./open-webui:/app/backend/data
        container_name: open-webui
        restart: always
        image: ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:ollama
 volumes:
    ollama:
        external: true
        name: ollama
    open-webui:
        external: true
        name: open-webui
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Goyban	fe76630071	added jellyfin	2026-08-18 15:14:23 +02:00
Goyban	f1c75e95f2	updated scripts	2025-07-08 10:14:41 +02:00
Goyban	712e08d038	Initial commit	2025-07-08 09:14:59 +02:00