goyban
b7a0a86be2
Audit fixes: - Wallet names were used unvalidated as file paths, so a name like "../<other-id>/x" reached another user's wallet directory or overwrote bot_settings.json. Names are now validated and every path is resolved and confirmed to sit inside the caller's own directory, which also blocks a planted symlink from escaping. - Tor mode leaked: the mempool.space fee check opened a direct clear-net connection, tying the server's IP to its Bitcoin activity. It now goes through Tor's SOCKS proxy to mempool's onion service, DNS included. - The xpub message was left in the chat forever. It reveals the wallet's whole address and balance history, so it is now deleted like the password is. - Inline buttons stay live on old messages, so a user removed from the allow-list could keep using them. Callbacks re-check authorisation, and auth_check now works for callback queries instead of raising on a null message. - Wallet names echoed back in callback_data are confirmed against the user's real wallet list. - Settings are written via temp file + atomic rename; a crash mid-write used to truncate the file and lose every user's wallet selection. - Replies were sent against messages that had just been deleted; deletion is now best-effort and cannot abort the flow. Deployment: - Allow-list can come from ALLOWED_USERS instead of a bind-mounted file, so a deployment needs no files on disk. Both sources merge when both are present. - A missing bind-mounted allowed_users.txt made Docker create a directory in its place and silently lock everyone out; the entrypoint now detects that and stops with an explanation. - Standard mode honours ELECTRUM_SERVER, which previously only worked in Tor mode despite being documented. - Added VERSION, push.sh, docker-compose.deploy.yml and .env.deploy.example for a two-file deploy off the published image. Docs rewritten in English and Persian around the name Telegtrum, leading with the security model and what it does not protect against. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
41 lines
1.3 KiB
Bash
41 lines
1.3 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
set -e
|
|
|
|
: "${UMBREL_IP:?UMBREL_IP is not set. Add it to your .env file (e.g. UMBREL_IP=192.168.1.100)}"
|
|
|
|
mkdir -p /root/.electrum/wallets
|
|
|
|
# The allow-list may come from ALLOWED_USERS instead of a mounted file. Missing
|
|
# is fine; a *directory* here means Docker auto-created one for a bind mount
|
|
# that pointed at a non-existent path, which would silently lock everyone out.
|
|
ALLOWED_FILE="${ALLOWED_USERS_FILE:-/app/allowed_users.txt}"
|
|
if [ -d "$ALLOWED_FILE" ]; then
|
|
echo "ERROR: $ALLOWED_FILE is a directory."
|
|
echo "Create the file on the host before starting, or drop the bind mount"
|
|
echo "and set ALLOWED_USERS=<id>,<id> in your .env instead." >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ ! -f "$ALLOWED_FILE" ] && [ -z "${ALLOWED_USERS:-}" ]; then
|
|
echo "WARNING: no allow-list found — set ALLOWED_USERS or mount $ALLOWED_FILE" >&2
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
CONFIG="/root/.electrum/config"
|
|
if [ ! -f "$CONFIG" ]; then
|
|
echo "Writing default config..."
|
|
cat > "$CONFIG" <<EOF
|
|
{
|
|
"auto_connect": false,
|
|
"enable_proxy": false,
|
|
"oneserver": true,
|
|
"server": "${UMBREL_IP}:50001:t"
|
|
}
|
|
EOF
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo "Starting Electrum daemon..."
|
|
rm -f /root/.electrum/daemon
|
|
electrum daemon -d
|
|
|
|
echo "Electrum daemon started. Launching bot..."
|
|
exec /opt/electrum/bin/python3 /app/bot.py
|